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51. Introductory remarks
1.1 A lifelong fascination for nationality law
Ruit hora.1 Time runs quickly. This hour I will deliver my valedictory lecture as 
ordinary professor at Maastricht University. Nobody will be surprised that this 
lecture will deal with the subject of nationality law. For a considerable part of 
my academic career I have worked on publications in this field and on the related 
area of international family law.
It is today an appropriate occasion to reveal when and why I developed such a strong 
interest in this field of law. This actually happened when I was a teenager and for 
quite personal reasons. My interest in nationality law was triggered by some interest-
ing cases dealing with the nationality position of several close relatives.
I had three aunts in Belgium. One of them had dual nationality2: she was Belgian 
by birth but also possessed Netherlands nationality3 by marriage. My second 
aunt always said that she was stateless. However, later I discovered that she was 
not de iure stateless, but rather that she had huge difficulties in being recognised 
as a national of the Netherlands by marriage after losing her Belgian nationality. 
As a matter of fact, she was de facto stateless. My third aunt was Belgian: she 
had acquired this nationality by marriage and by that fact lost her Netherlands 
nationality. But although she was a Belgian national, she did not have voting 
rights. As a Belgian by marriage, her position was equated with that of a per-
son who had acquired nationality by a so-called ordinary naturalisation, which 
granted in fact only a second-class nationality.4
My older sister emigrated with her husband to California in the mid-fifties of the 
past century. My nieces and nephew were born in the USA as American citizens, 
but they possessed also Netherlands nationality.5 In the mid-sixties my sister and 
brother in law naturalised in the USA. They lost Netherlands nationality because 
of the voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality. However, my nieces and 
nephew did not lose Netherlands nationality, because they were not included in 
the naturalisation of their parents due to the fact that they had already acquired 
U.S. citizenship at birth.6
1 “Time is running away”; personal motto of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645).
2 The terms nationality and citizenship will be used interchangeably in this publication. 
3 In this publication the expression “Netherlands nationality” will be used in order to refer to the nationality of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. The expression “Netherlands nationality” is preferred above the confusing expression 
“Dutch nationality”. 
4 Note that the distinction between the ordinary naturalisation (naturalisation ordinaire) and the full naturalisation 
(naturalisation grande) was only abolished in 1993.
5 Compare case C20 in De Groot 2007a, 167-178.
6 They lost Netherlands nationality on 1 January 1995 by ten years of residence abroad in the country of their birth 
and being also in possession of the nationality of that country (Art. 15 lit. c Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap (he-
reinafter: RwNed) as in force from 1985-2003). On that day also my Belgian-Netherlands aunt lost her Netherlands 
nationality by the operation of the same article. 
6Yet another nationality issue in my family was the position of the second hus-
band of my maternal grandmother. Although he was born in the Netherlands 
and possessed only Netherlands nationality, he lost this by residing ten years in 
Belgium, because he forgot to lodge the required declaration of prolongation. 
He became de iure stateless.7
It is obvious that my first steps in the field of nationality law were in light of 
these cases very much an experience of PBL (“Problem Based Learning”).8
A more systematic study of nationality law started after I finished my law stud-
ies at Groningen University in 1973 and received a scholarship to study in Ger-
many. At that time German lawyers and politicians discussed the question how 
to implement the principle of equal treatment of men and women in nationality 
law.9 I was fascinated by that discussion and wrote an article on the desirability 
to modify also Netherlands nationality law in order to bring this in conformity 
with the equality principle.10 This article was the basis for my first book dealing 
with the equality of men and women in nationality law in comparative perspec-
tive, written on the invitation of the Netherlands Association of Comparative 
Law.11
Since that time I have continued to work in the field of nationality law. The focus 
of my publications changed during the course of time. However, one topic was 
always present: from the seventies to today several publications deal with the is-
sue of whether or not having multiple nationalities is desirable. Moreover, since 
the early 1990s the relationship between the nationality of a Member State of 
the European Union and European citizenship became important. Consequently, 
the question whether EU law has relevancy for the grounds of acquisition and 
loss of nationality came to occupy a prominent place on the research agenda. For 
about fifteen years, special emphasis has been given to the issue of the reduction 
of statelessness. And more recently, several publications in the last ten years 
have dealt with the ban on arbitrary deprivation of nationality. It is striking that 
although the principle prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of nationality was 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights three years before my 
birth, little attention was devoted, until recently, to the question how this prohi-
bition should operate in practice.
7 This happened between 1903 and 1910 due to the operation of Art. 7 (5) Wet op het Nederlanderschap en het inge-
zetenschap as in force from 1893-1910). 
8 Note that PBL is the basis of the teaching approach of Maastricht University. See http://www.maastrichtuniversity.
nl/web/Main/Education/ProblemBasedLearning.htm.
9 The equal treatment of men and women was finally introduced in German nationality law on 1 January 1975. See 
Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsänderungsgesetz of 20 December 1974, Bundesgesetzblatt 1974 I, 3714. Note also 
the judgment of the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) 21 May 1974, BVerfGE 37, 217-264.
10 De Groot 1975.
11 De Groot 1977.
71.2  An ever growing corpus of international standards on nationality law
πα´ ντα ρ' ει˜.12 Things are constantly changing. That applies not only to an aca-
demic career, but also to nationality law as such. 
Traditionally, nationality law was within the domaine réservé of States.13 States 
were autonomous in nationality matters. However, during the past five decades 
many international standards were developed regarding the rules of acquisition 
and loss of nationality. Some important steps have to be briefly mentioned14:
The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (hereinafter : CRS)15 en-
tered into force 41 years ago. Racial discrimination was expressly prohibited in 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination of 1966 (hereinafter: CERD).16 The equal treatment of men and women 
was prescribed in the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination 
of Women (hereinafter: CEDAW).17 Ten years later, in 1989, the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (hereinafter: CRC)18 was adopted. All these Conventions 
contain provisions with high relevancy for nationality law.
At the regional level the European Convention on Nationality of 1997 (hereinaf-
ter: ECN)19 is of paramount importance, being the first comprehensive national-
ity convention in the world.20 But also Art. 20 of the 1969 American Convention 
on Human Rights (hereinafter: AmCHR)21, Art. 6 of the 1990 African Charter 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereinafter: ACC)22, Art. 24 of the 1995 
Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human Rights and Fun-
dament Freedoms (hereinafter CISC)23 and Art. 29 of the 2004 Arab Charter on 
Human Rights (hereinafter: ArCHR)24 fit in this list.25 
In addition to these treaties significant soft law instruments have been adopted. 
At the global level the UNHCR Guidelines on statelessness which were pub-
lished between 2012-201526 are influential. Also the 2009 Report of the UN 
12 “Everything flows”; this aphorism was used by Simplicius (c. 490-560) in order to characterise the thoughts of 
Heraclitus (c. 535-475 BC).
13 See inter alia Art. 1 of the Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law 
(HCNL), LNTS 179, 89.
14 See for a comprehensive overview of all relevant rules De Groot/ Vonk 2016b.
15 UNTS 989, 175.
16 UNTS 660, 195.
17 UNTS 1249, 13.
18 UNTS 1599, 3.
19 CETS 166. 
20 Note also the 2006 Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession 
(ECSS), which develops some principles already enshrined in the ECN for the state succession context.
21 OAS Treaty Series No. 36; UNTS 1144, 123.
22 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).
23 www.refworld.org/docid/49997ae32c.html.
24 www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/loas2005.html?msource=UNWDEC19001&tr=y&auid=3337655 
25 See also Art. 7 of the 2005 Covenant of the Rights of the Child in Islam (available on: http://www.refworld.org/
docid/44eaf0e4a.html )www.refworld.org/docid/44eafOe4a.html andArt. 18 of the 2012 ASEAN Declaration of Human 
Rights (available on: www.thecambodiaherald.com/cambodia/full-text-of-asean-human-rights-declaration-2773).
26 The UNHCR Guidelines on statelessness 1-3 are now included (with some minimal changes) in the ‘Handbook 
8Secretary General to the Human Rights Council on arbitrary deprivation of na-
tionality is pivotal.27 In the European context the Council of Europe Recommen-
dation 2009/13 of the Committee of Ministers on the nationality of children28 
deserves attention.
And the work goes on: in the African context a Nationality Protocol to the Afri-
can Convention on Human and Peoples Rights29 will, it is hoped, soon be adopt-
ed. After adoption and entry into force that Protocol will be the most compre-
hensive international instrument in the field of nationality law.30
Of course, the treaties just mentioned are strictly spoken only binding for States 
that acceded to these conventions. Soft law documents are even less binding. 
But all these documents have at least a persuasive character. Together they con-
stitute the framework of international standards within which States should draw 
the picture of their nationality rules. 
In the recent past important case law limited – in particular in the European 
context31 – the autonomy of States in nationality matters. In the landmark deci-
sion in Genovese v Malta 32 the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: 
ECtHR) came to the conclusion that citizenship is a part of the social identity of 
a person which is as such protected under the concept of private life of Art. 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR). The access to 
citizenship has therefore to be regulated in a non-discriminatory way.33 It is very 
likely that the message of the ECtHR in Genovese v Malta also has consequenc-
es for the regulation of the loss of citizenship.34 
on protection of stateless persons under the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons’; see http://
www.refworld.org/docid/53b676aa4.html. The UNHCR Guidelines on statelessness No. 4 (on the interpretation of 
the Articles 1-4 of the 1961 CRS) can be consulted on http://www.refworld.org/docid/50d460c72.html . The UNHCR 
Guidelines on statelessness No. 5 (on the interpretation of the Articles 5-9 of the 1961 CRS) will be published soon.
27 UN Human Rights Council, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General, 
14 December 2009, A/HRC/13/34, available on http://www.refworld.org/docid/4b83a9cb2.html (hereinafter: SG UN 
2009). See also UN Human Rights Council, Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality: Report of the 
Secretary-General, 19 December 2013, A/HRC/25/28, available on http://www.refworld.org/docid/52f8d19a4.html 
(hereinafter: SG UN 2013).
28 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cdcj/CDCJ%20Recommendations/CMRec(2009)13E_NationaliteDesEnfants.
pdf See on Rec. 2009/13 De Groot 2014a.
29 Manby 2015, 462-466. 
30 Note also the 1999 Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of States prepared 
by the ILC.
31 However, note also for the Americas inter alia Case of the Yean and Bosico Children v. The Dominican Republic, 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR), 8 September 2005, available at: http://www.refworld.org/
docid/44e497d94.html and for Africa: Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) and Open 
Society Justice Initiative (on behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya) v. the Government of Kenya, Decision 
No 002/Com/002/2009, African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACERWC), 22 March 
2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4f5f04492.html .
32 ECtHR 11 October 2011 (application no. 53124/09). See De Groot/ Vonk 2012.
33 See also ECtHR 26 June 2014 in Labassee (no. 65941/11) and in Mennesson (application no. 65192/11).
34 In other words, nationality is now protected under the ECHR and also under the ACC, AmCHR, ArCHR and CISC. 
9The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: CJEU) concluded in 
Janko Rottmann35 that deprivation of the nationality of a Member State of the 
European Union with statelessness as a consequence may only happen after a 
European proportionality test. It is likely that also other general principles of 
European law, like e.g. the equality principle and the principle of protection of 
legitimate expectation limit the power of Member States in nationality matters.36 
1.3 The increase of comparative nationality law studies
In the past decades comparative studies on nationality law increased in volume 
and, thanks to the cooperation of lawyers, political scientists, sociologists and 
others, acquired more depth.37 Now we have a considerably better and more 
detailed overview of the huge variety of rules in this field. The most impor-
tant achievement is the EUDO CITIZENSHIP Global Database on Modes of 
Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship (hereinafter: Eudo-citizenship database).38 
Linked to that database several research projects deepened our understanding of 
comparative nationality law, such as ACIT39 and ILEC.40 
Several of these projects try to assess to what extent the laws of States are in 
accordance with the international standards following from treaties and other 
international instruments.41
1.4 How much freedom is left?
In light of these developments we now should ask what kind of choices States 
have to make when regulating their nationality law. How much freedom do they 
still enjoy in light of those standards? Between which alternatives choices have 
to be made? And what are the advantages and disadvantages of available op-
tions? 
The time is ripe to develop a kind of toolbox for nationality legislation in order 
to facilitate discussions on national level between stakeholders involved in na-
tionality law reform, but also in order to enhance discussions on international 
level in view of developing new, more detailed standards. What should such a 
toolbox look like?
35 ECJ 2 March 2010, C-135/08. See De Groot / Seling 2010.
36 AG Poiares Maduro in his opinion (30 September 2009) in Rottmann, para. 28-32.
37 Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2000; Faist and Kivisto 2007; Hansen and Weil 2001; Pitkänen and Kalekin-Fishman 
2007.
38 http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases.
39 Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration (ACIT); see http://eudo-citizenship.eu/about/acit.
40 Involuntary Loss of European Citizenship (ILEC); see http://www.ilecproject.eu/. See also Carrera/ De Groot 2015.
41 See e.g. the ILEC Guidelines 2015, available on http://www.ilecproject.eu/sites/default/files/GUIDELINES%20
INVOLUNTARY%20LOSS%20OF%20EUROPEAN%20CITIZENSHIP%20.pdf , also in Carrera Nuñez- De Groot 
2015, 595-602.
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For all possible grounds of acquisition and loss of nationality the toolbox should 
first describe the relevant international standards. Subsequently, it has to indicate 
how much room is left for States to create their own rules, which choices have 
to be made and the consequences that the different choices entail. Sometimes 
the choice for a certain rule implies consequences for other potential nationality 
law rules: if a country makes a choice in favour of a rule that all children born on 
the territory acquire the nationality of the country (ius soli), there is no need for 
a default rule facilitating the access to the nationality of the country of birth for 
otherwise stateless children. In other cases the choice may have consequences 
beyond nationality law: e.g. deprivation of nationality because of terrorist activ-
ities may reduce the international criminal jurisdiction of the country involved.
In order to illustrate the proposed toolbox, I propose to give seven examples:
• Acquisition of nationality based on parentage (ius filiationis/ ius sanguinis)
• Acquisition of nationality based on adoption
• Loss of nationality due to residence abroad
•  Loss of nationality due to activities seriously prejudicial to the vital interests 
of the State
• Loss of nationality due to loss of a family relationship
• Procedural safeguards
• Protection of legitimate expectations
The first five categories are closely related to so-called modes of acquisition and 
loss of nationality as identified and listed in the Eudo-citizenship database.42 
The sixth and seventh examples have a more general character. Procedural safe-
guards are of importance for all grounds for acquisition and loss, whereas the 
protection of legitimate expectations can play a role in respect of most grounds 
for acquisition.
The toolbox can be seen as a way to consolidate the existing international 
standards in an accessible way. However, it should not take the shape of a 
kind of model code of nationality. In the sensitive field of nationality – where 
States often have very strong and explicit feelings – such a code would go too 
far. However, the toolbox should facilitate the debate between nationality law 
policy makers: a good picture of relevant rules on international level should 
be offered43, together with an analysis of alternatives between which choic-
es should be made on national level. Descriptions of good and bad practices 
should complete the picture.
42 See http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases.
43 It is of course obvious that in the national debate it matters considerably whether a State is bound by certain interna-
tional standards because they are enshrined in a treaty to which the State involved is a Contracting Party, or whether 
the status of an international rule is only persuasive due to the fact that it is part of a treaty to which this State did not 
accede or can be found in an international soft law instrument. 
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1.5 Nationality, genuine link and social identity
Before describing in more detail the structure of the toolbox which I propose, 
some general remarks on nationality and nationality law are appropriate.
The nationality of a person indicates that an important link exists between this 
person and the State of nationality. This link is often described as genuine link or 
genuine connection.44 The basis of this genuine link can be a parentage tie with 
a national of that State, birth on its territory or having lived there for a consider-
able period of time. In the course of the life of a person (s)he may lose the link 
with the State of her or his nationality. This may lead to the loss of nationality 
but the international standards – as they are now interpreted – do in principle not 
allow a loss of nationality leading to statelessness.
If a person has a genuine link with a State, (s)he should have access to that 
State’s nationality in a non-discriminatory way. This follows inter alia from the 
2011 ECtHR ruling in Genovese v Malta. In that case the genuine link was 
parentage. The child claiming access to Maltese nationality had a Maltese fa-
ther, but was born out of wedlock. For that reason he did not have access to the 
nationality of his father. As mentioned above, the Court stated that the nation-
ality of a person is part of her or his social identity and as such protected under 
the notion of “private life” as laid down in Art. 8 ECHR. However, one should 
realise that the child did not yet possess Maltese nationality, but was claiming 
access to that nationality. In other words, if there is a relevant genuine link with 
a State – like in Genovese v Malta via parentage - the access to the nationality of 
the State has to be given in a non-discriminatory way. Children born in wedlock 
and those born out of wedlock have to be treated equally.
In my opinion we can apply the reasoning of the ECtHR in Genovese v Malta 
to other types of genuine links with a State.45 Consequently, also the access to 
the nationality of a State with which a person has a genuine link based on birth 
on the territory or by living there for a long period should be given in a non-dis-
criminatory way and the denial of such access should be open to administrative 
or judicial review. The grounds for a denial should be proportionate.
The existence of a genuine link in connection with the principle of proportion-
ality is also essential for grounds for loss. In principle, no loss of nationality 
should occur if there is evidently a genuine link between the person involved 
and the State of nationality. Even in the case of deprivation of nationality due to 
fraud, the fact of an existing genuine link is an important factor which has to be 
taken into account in the context of a proportionality test.46 
44 ICJ 6 April 1955 in Nottebohm, ICJ Reports 1955, 4.
45 Note that the ECtHR based the protection of the access to nationality on “private life” and not on “family life”. 
“Family life” requires a tie with another person (e.g. by parentage), whereas “private life” can encompass all kinds 
of circumstances. 
46 ECJ 2 March 2010, C-135/08 in Rottmann, para. 55.
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To sum up: there is an intimate relationship between the social identity of a per-
son as part of her or his private life and the genuine link between a person and a 
State which is manifested by the nationality of that State. This relationship has 
to be kept in mind while writing on or even developing international standards 
in the field of nationality law and also if one assesses national rules on grounds 
of acquisition and loss of nationality.
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2. Examples of the toolbox structure
Hereinafter the structure of the proposed toolbox will be illustrated by giving 
seven examples. In order to make this presentation more lively, each of the ex-
amples of the toolbox structure will be introduced by the description of a prob-
lematic case, which will also be briefly assessed in light of the international 
standards described in the toolbox. 
2.1 Acquisition of nationality based on parentage (ius sanguinis/ ius filiationis)
2.1.1 Case 1 Delayed DNA evidence
Arthur Amsingh, a man of Netherlands nationality, recognises Brian, born in 
Surinam out of wedlock as the child of a Surinamese mother. Due to the fact that 
Brian had already reached the age of seven years at the time of the recognition, 
he did not automatically acquire Netherlands nationality by becoming the son 
of a Netherlands father. This nationality will only be acquired if the biological 
truth of the recognition is proven by submitting a DNA-report within one year 
after the recognition 47 Arthur asked at the Embassy of the Netherlands where 
such a report could be ordered. An address of an institute was provided. A cou-
ple of months later Arthur proudly submits the report - confirming that he is with 
99,9 % certainty the biological father of Brian - to the Embassy, but the officer 
in charge nevertheless refuses the report, because the institute involved is not 
accredited according the relevant international standards. Arthur now requests 
a report of an accredited institute. Again after a couple of months he submits a 
report of the accredited institution, also confirming the biological truth of the 
recognition. But the Embassy refuses again to issue a Netherlands passport for 
Brian, because he did not acquire Netherlands nationality due to the fact that 
the second report was submitted more than one year after the recognition! 48 
2.1.2 Relevant international standards
A child has the right to acquire the nationality of a parent but States may make 
exceptions for children born abroad and may provide for a special procedure for 
children born out of wedlock.49 However, if the child would otherwise be state-
less the child must always automatically acquire the nationality of the parent, 
also in case of birth abroad.50 What is more, a State may never make a distinction 
based on the maternal or paternal parentage.51 In other words, the acquisition 
of nationality through the father (ius sanguinis a patre) needs to happen under 
the same conditions as the acquisition of nationality through the mother (ius 
47 See Art. 4 (3) RwNed as in force since 2009.
48 The case description is based on an e-mail I received from the lawyer of the father. For reasons of privacy, the names 
of the individuals concerned have been changed throughout this lecture. Compare also the judgment of the Court of 
The Hague (Rechtbank Den Haag) 25 February 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:2305.
49 Art. 6 ECN; Principle 10 Rec. 2009/13.
50 Principle 1 Rec. 2009/13.
51 Art. 9(2) CEDAW; ECtHR 11 October 2011 in Genovese v Malta. 
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sanguinis a matre. Moreover, a State may never regulate any ground for acqui-
sition of nationality in a way which would result in ethnic, racial or religious 
discrimination.52 
A State may provide that a child of a national born abroad only acquires the 
nationality of this parent if a) both parents are nationals; b) both parents lodge 
a joint declaration; or c) one parent lodges a declaration.53 A State may also 
differentiate between the first, second and subsequent generations born abroad. 
Parent is a person who acquired this status under the law of the State involved 
or under foreign law but recognised in the State involved. It does not matter 
whether the legal status of parent is based on genetic truth. A State shall not 
make the acquisition of nationality by parentage conditional on evidence of the 
biological truth if this evidence was not yet a condition for the establishment 
of the parentage.54 Furthermore, if the parentage established abroad between 
a child born by a surrogate mother with an intending parent is recognised by 
the State of nationality of this parent, the child must have access to the nation-
ality of the intending parent under the same conditions as a child born to this 
parent.55 In other words, it is not the “blood” (sanguis) of a child that matters 
for the acquisition of nationality but the legal tie of parentage (filiatio). It is for 
that reason considerably better to use the expression ius filiationis instead of the 
old-fashioned ius sanguinis.56 
2.1.3 Choices to be made
As mentioned above, States have to decide whether they want to restrict the 
acquisition of the nationality by parentage in cases of birth abroad. A reason to 
do so will be the assumption that a child born abroad will not build sufficiently 
close ties with the State of nationality of the parent to justify the attribution of 
nationality.57 However, an alternative for limiting the acquisition of nationality 
in the case of birth abroad is to provide for loss of nationality because of resi-
dence abroad by a person born abroad and living permanently abroad during a 
certain number of years after having attained the age of majority.58 An obvious 
advantage of this alternative is the fact that the child can decide to build up ties 
with the country of nationality in order to avoid the loss of nationality.
A disadvantage of limiting the acquisition of nationality by parentage in case of 
birth abroad or to make this conditional on the consent of both parents creates 
52 Art. 5 ECN, Art. 5 CERD, Art. 9 CRS.
53 Art. 6 ECN.
54 Principle 10 Rec. 2009/13.
55 Principle 11 Rec. 2009/13 and para. 32 of the Explanatory Memorandum on this Recommendation. Compare also 
ECtHR 26 June 2014 in Labassee and in Mennesson. See on the nationality status of children arising from inter-
country surrogacy arrangements Wells-Greco 2015.
56 See Bauböck 2015, David de Groot 2015 and Eva Ersbøll 2015.
57 Vink/De Groot 2010a and 2010b.
58 De Groot/Vink 2014, para. 6 and table 3.5. See hereinafter para. 2.3.
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problems in respect of diplomatic and consular protection of the child in case 
of (parental) child abduction. If the child does not acquire the nationality of 
a parent because of a general limitation of the transfer of nationality at birth 
in case of birth abroad or because the non-national parent refuses to give the 
required consent for the acquisition of nationality and the parents split up the 
parent whose nationality the child does not possess may be legally prejudiced in 
requesting diplomatic or consular assistance of her or his own State if the child 
is abducted to another country. 
To make the acquisition of nationality of a parent by the child in case of birth 
abroad conditional on the registration as a national on the request of a parent is 
also not unproblematic. The first problem is whether a State is entitled to provide 
that only the national-parent can request such registration. A negative answer 
seems to be appropriate.59 If the parentage is established against the will of the 
parent involved (s)he may be tempted not to register the child in order to avoid 
the child developing nationality ties with the State involved. 
Making the acquisition of nationality conditional on the registration by either 
parent is less problematic but one should realise that later in life the child will 
perhaps not share the ‘reasons’ of the parent(s) for non-registration. The reason 
for non-registration may be indifference, lack of information on the necessity to 
register, or may be of a more serious nature. Be this as it may, it is not difficult 
to imagine that children may be of a different opinion and may develop a huge 
interest in acquiring the nationality of the parent. In that light it is attractive to 
offer the child a window to register as a national also during a certain period 
after having attained the age of majority.60 In favour of this solution is the fact 
that the child as a young adult is no longer subject to the parental authority of 
the parent(s). A disadvantage of this solution is evidently that the child would 
also be able to register as a national if until that moment no ties where developed 
with the country involved. 
A disadvantage of allowing registration of the child as national by only one par-
ent can also be problematic if the child already acquired ex lege the nationality 
of the country of the other parent. If this other state classifies the acquisition of 
nationality by registration as voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality, this 
may trigger the loss of the first acquired nationality.61
A related issue is the following. Quid iuris if the parentage tie was only estab-
lished after having attained the age of majority? Most legal systems provide 
only for acquisition of nationality by parentage, if this parentage was established 
59 De Groot/Vonk 2012 conclude this from the ruling of the ECtHR 11 October 2011 in Genovese v Malta.
60 Compare Art. 1(2)(a) 1961 Convention. See De Groot 2012a.
61 See for an example on the loss of Norwegian nationality by the child of a Norwegian mother and an Australian 
father due to the registration of the child as an Australian national: http://statsborger.no/en/how-nina-cannot-live-
together-with-her-kids-in-norway/ .
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during the minority of the child.62 However, some States provide for a different 
age limit63 or an alternative access to nationality instead of an automatic acqui-
sition (for example registration within a certain period) after the establishment 
of the parentage.64 These alternatives are in particular welcome in cases where 
e.g. a mother made an arrangement (often against payment) with the biological 
father not to establish the paternity. If the child is not able to start as a minor the 
procedure for a judicial establishment of paternity, the child would be deprived 
of the possibility to acquire the nationality of his father by parentage in case (s)
he has to wait until having attained the age of majority. Giving the young adult 
an own window to acquire the nationality of the father seems to be appropriate.
Again another issue arises if the State provides for acquisition of nationality iure 
filiationis but documentary evidence on the parentage is lacking. It is certainly 
a best practice that Austria allows in such cases proof of parentage by DNA-ev-
idence.65 It is questionable, however, whether the rule that the person involved 
has to pay the costs of the DNA-test can be recommended with respect to less 
wealthy States. 
2.1.4 Related grounds for acquisition and loss and related general issues
The acquisition of nationality by parentage is in the Eudo-citizenship database 
subdivided into three categories: 1) birth in the country as child of a national, 2) 
birth abroad as child of a national and 3) establishment of parentage after birth.66 
For academic comparative law purposes this subdivision is very useful but we 
can observe that several legal systems regulate the three categories by one rule: 
the child of a national parent is a national. For that reason, these different (sub)
categories have to be presented together in the tool box.
A related ground for acquisition of nationality is adoption.67 It has been men-
tioned that parentage as a ground for acquisition of nationality should not de-
pend on how this parentage is established and it should be irrelevant whether 
or not the parentage reflects the biological truth. Insofar there seems to be a 
justification to present adoption as a subcategory of parentage. However, three 
reasons lead to the conclusion that a separate discussion of adoption is to be pre-
ferred. First, not all adoptions replace the original parentage tie completely by a 
parentage tie with the adoptive parents. Second, some attention has to be given 
to defective adoption procedures, i.e. those cases where a child was residing in a 
62 Eudo-citizenship database mode A04.
63 Para. 4(1) StAG: the parentage must be established by recognition or the procedure requesting judicial establish-
ment of paternity must be initiated before the young adult reached the age of 23 years.
64 Art. 17(2) Cc esp.: the young adult has an option right to Spanish nationality during a period of two years after the 
establishment of paternity.
65 Para. 5(2) StBG.
66 Modes of acquisition A01a (birth in the country as child of a national), A01b (birth abroad as child of a national) 
and A04 (“establishment of paternity”). The label of A04 is slightly problematic in light of the fact, that some legal 
systems also provide for the establishment of maternity (see e.g. Art. 1:207 Civil Code of the Netherlands (Burgerlijk 
Wetboek) as in force since 1 April 2014). For that reason a label “establishment of parentage” would be preferable.
67 Eudo-citizenship database mode A10.
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particular state with a view of being adopted but the adoption was not finalised. 
Third, in case of intercountry adoption most adopted children are born abroad. 
This very important issue will be further discussed in the next chapter.68
It was already mentioned above that loss due to permanent residence abroad is 
related.69 
Another related ground for loss is loss of nationality due to loss of the family 
relationship which was the basis for the acquisition.70
A huge difficulty may arise if the nationality of a person is based on the par-
entage tie with a national (iure filiationis) and after many years the authorities 
discover that this parentage tie did never exist. We are then confronted with 
so-called quasi-loss of nationality: in many States the authorities will conclude 
that the nationality was never acquired but the person involved will experience 
this “non-acquisition” as a loss of nationality.71 This issue is closely linked to the 
need to protect legitimate expectations.72 
2.1.5 An assessment of case 1
It follows from the international standards described above, in particular from 
Recommendation 2009/13 and its Explanatory report, but also from the ECtHR 
decision in Genovese v Malta that the requirement of submitting a DNA-report 
proving the biological truth of the recognition as a condition for the acquisition 
of nationality of the father is not in conformity with the international standards. 
Given the fact that according to the law of the Netherlands recognition estab-
lishes a parentage tie also if it is not in conformity with the biological truth, it is 
not acceptable to require the fulfilment of the additional substantive requirement 
of submitting DNA-evidence on the biological truth in order to acquire Neth-
erlands nationality. The legislator of the Netherlands should therefore remove 
this requirement or – alternatively – should introduce the requirement of the bi-
ological truth already in its family law. A judge dealing with a case as described 
above could in light of the Genovese v Malta ruling conclude that the nationality 
of the Netherlands is automatically acquired by the recognition. This is indeed 
reasonable, as it is unclear which goal is served by requiring that the evidence is 
submitted within one year.73
 
68 See para. 2.2.
69 Eudo-citizenship database mode L02. See hereinafter, para. 2.3.
70 Eudo-citizenship database mode L13a. See hereinafter, para. 2.5.
71 De Groot/Wautelet 2014.
72 This will be further elaborated in para. 2.7.
73 The argumentation of the Court of the Hague 25 February 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:2305 that the time limit 
serves the legal certainty is – to put it mildly – far from convincing (see para. 5.3 of the judgment). It is furthermore 
striking that the transitory provision of Art. II of the Kingdom Act of 27 June 2008, Stb. 2008, 270 also requires the 
submission of DNA-evidence in order to acquire Netherlands nationality for a recognised child, but without any limi-
tation in time! Because of this inconsequent attitude of the Netherlands, it is highly unlikely that the ECtHR would 
accept any argumentation as justification of the additional requirement of DNA evidence of the biological truth within 
one year after the recognition. 
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2.2 Acquisition based on adoption
2.2.1 Case 2 A foreign adoption
Berend Bodewes and Caroline Claassen, two spouses of Netherlands nationality 
living abroad, adopt a girl, Dorothy, in 1990. After the adoption is completed 
they successfully ask the Embassy of the Netherlands to issue a passport for the 
child. 25 years – and five passports - later an application by Dorothy for a new 
passport is rejected with the argument that she did never acquired Netherlands 
nationality by the adoption. Until 1998 only an adoption by decision of a court 
in the Netherlands was a ground for acquisition of nationality. Since 1998 an 
adoption in a Contracting State to the Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention 
also has nationality consequences, whereas since 2004 the recognition of an 
adoption in other countries can have as a consequence that Netherlands nation-
ality is acquired. However, regrettably transitory rules favouring the acquisition 
of nationality in case of foreign adoptions realised before 1998, respectively 
2004 are completely lacking. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands (Hoge Raad) as well as the Council of State as Supreme Administrative 
Court repeatedly stressed, that Netherlands nationality cannot be acquired on 
the basis of protection of legitimate expectations74. 
2.2.2 Relevant international standards
In respect of acquisition of nationality by adoption – surprisingly - not many 
rules exist. Art. 6(4)(d) ECN provides that states shall facilitate the acquisition 
of their nationality for children adopted by one of their nationals. The same 
rule is included in Art. 12 of the 2008 European Convention on the Adoption of 
Children (revised) (hereinafter ECAC). However, neither of these conventions 
prescribes concrete ways for this to take place and the conditions which may be 
required. 
In the case of adoption, a family relationship is created between the adopted 
child and his or her adopter(s). As a consequence of this newly created legal 
parentage, the adopted child’s legal position should, also in respect of nationality 
law, as far as possible, be identical to the position of a biological child of the 
parent(s). This is inter alia prescribed by the Hague Convention on protection of 
children and co-operation in respect of intercountry adoption of 29 May 199375 
(Hague Adoption Convention; hereinafter HAC) as well as by Art. 11(1) ECAC 
2008 (revised). That provision provides that: 
“Upon adoption a child shall become a full member of the family of the adop-
ter(s) and shall have in regard to the adopter(s) and his, her or their family the 
74 This case description is based on three different, but similar cases. Two of these cases were brought to my attention 
by the lawyers of the adopted children involved, the third case was sent to me by a registrar of civil status. In the latter 
case the person, adopted as a child, had already reached the age of 59 years and had been constantly in possession of 
a Netherlands passport. In the other two cases the adopted persons were young adults.
75 Available on https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=69.
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same rights and obligations as a child of the adopter(s) whose parentage is 
legally established.”76
Art. 26(2) HAC 1993 provides:
“In the case of an adoption having the effect of terminating a pre-existing legal 
parent-child relationship, the child shall enjoy in the receiving State, and in any 
other Contracting State where the adoption is recognised, rights equivalent to 
those resulting from adoptions having this effect in each such State.”
In September 2005, the Special Commission on the practical operation of the 
Hague Adoption Convention (established pursuant to a decision of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law), adopted a set of Recommendations, 
of which Recommendation No. 17 dealt with nationality:
17. The Special Commission recommends that the child be accorded automat-
ically the nationality of one of the adoptive parents or of the receiving State, 
without the need to rely on any action of the adoptive parents. Where this is 
not possible, the receiving States are encouraged to provide the necessary as-
sistance to ensure the child obtains such citizenship. The policy of Contracting 
States regarding the nationality of the child should be guided by the overriding 
importance of avoiding a situation in which an adopted child is stateless.77
Recommendation No. 17 was reaffirmed by the June 2010 Meeting of the Spe-
cial Commission, which added that: 
20. Central Authorities should co-operate in the completion of any formalities 
necessary for the acquisition by the child of the nationality, where appropriate, 
either of the receiving State or of an adoptive parent.
21. The question of whether nationality will be granted to the child may, where 
appropriate, be a relevant factor when a State of origin is considering co-oper-
ation with a particular receiving State.78
As a result, because of the adoption, an adopted child should acquire ex lege the 
nationality of the adoptive parents without any additional conditions or proce-
dures.79 However, domestic nationality law may provide for restrictions similar 
76 Please note the tension between Art. 11(1) ECAC and Art. 12 ECAC which only prescribes a facilitation of the 
acquisition of nationality of the adopters which is far from granting adopted children the same rights as other children 
of the adopter. 
77 Conclusions and Recommendations of the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the Practical Operation 
of the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption (17-23 September 2005).
78 Special Commission on the practical operation of the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Child-
ren and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (17-25 June 2010), Conclusions and Recommendations 
Adopted by the Special Commission.
79 See Para. 36 and 37 of the Explanatory Memorandum on Rec. 2009/13.
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to those applicable to biological children in cases of birth abroad, if these restric-
tions do not lead to statelessness. It should be irrelevant whether the adoption 
decree was issued in the State involved or abroad. In the latter case, the mere fact 
of the recognition of the foreign adoption in the State of the nationality of the 
adoptive parents should have nationality consequences. This principle should 
apply to all full adoptions, i.e. where the legal relationship between the child and 
his or her father, mother and family of origin is terminated and replaced by the 
legal relationship with the adopter(s). 
In light of these considerations Recommendation 2009/13 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe recommends to the Member States of the 
Council of Europe
“13. subject the granting of their nationality to children adopted by a national 
to no other exceptions than those generally applicable to the acquisition of their 
nationality by right of blood, if as a consequence of the adoption the family re-
lationship between the child and the parent(s) of origin is completely replaced 
by the family relationship between the child and the adopter(s)”
If a State provides for other forms of adoption having more limited effects (for 
instance a so-called simple adoption, which does not completely replace the 
original family relationship by a legal family relationship with the adopter(s)), 
a State may also provide for the acquisition of its nationality ex lege, but should 
at least facilitate the acquisition of its nationality. The latter rule should also 
apply if a foreign simple adoption is recognised as a simple adoption, e.g. as 
prescribed by the rules of the 1993 Hague Adoption Convention.80 
Principle 14 of Rec. 2009/ 13 therefore recommends that States:
“facilitate the acquisition of their nationality by children adopted by a national 
in the case of an adoption in which the family relationship between the child 
and the parent(s) of origin is not completely replaced by the family relationship 
between the child and the adopter(s)”.
A very special problem arises if a foreign child resides for a considerable period 
of time in the State of residence of a prospective adopting parent with a view to 
being adopted and the adoption is not finalised (i.e. not granted or not complet-
ed). Such a child should be entitled to apply for the acquisition of the nationality 
of the State of residence.81 First, due to the fact that the State allowed the child 
to enter its territory in view of a future adoption, this State has taken a special 
responsibility for the future of this particularly vulnerable child. Second, as a 
result of the child’s residence on this territory he or she acquires a genuine link 
80 See Art. 23-27 HAC.
81 See Para. 40 of the Explanatory Memorandum on Rec. 2009/13.
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with the State involved, whereas insufficient ties could be developed with her or 
his country of origin. Of course, in all cases where the adoption was not granted 
or the procedure is not completed, the highest priority should be to find another 
(adoption) family for the child. 
In light of these considerations principle 16 of Recommendation 2009/13 there-
fore underpins that States should:
“provide that foreign children lawfully residing on their territory with a view to 
adoption have the right to file applications for the acquisition of their nationali-
ty if the adoption is not finalised. States should not in this case require a period 
of more than five years of habitual residence on their territory”. 
2.2.3 Choices to be made
In light of the standards described in the previous paragraph, States should reg-
ulate the acquisition of nationality by children adopted by a national in a way 
equivalent to the acquisition of nationality iure filiationis. In that light, States 
could decide to apply in principle the general rules for acquisition iure filiationis 
also in case of adoption of a minor by a national.
As with the acquisition of nationality iure filiationis, a State has to regulate the 
consequences of an adoption of a child after (s)he has attained the age of ma-
jority. Some States provide for a facilitated naturalisation in such cases82 or by 
granting a possibility of acquisition of nationality by the exercise of an option 
right.83 
A very special question is whether a State which limits the acquisition of na-
tionality in case of birth abroad84 should do this also in case of adopted children 
born abroad. As such, the acquisition of nationality by adoption is an acquisition 
iure filiationis. As pointed out above, this could justify not regulating adoption 
as a separate way of acquisition of nationality but as a way to acquire the na-
tionality by ius filiationis. However, precisely in respect of the acquisition of 
nationality by adopted children born abroad a special regulation may be appro-
priate. The justification for posing a limitation of the acquisition of nationality 
iure filiationis in case of birth abroad is the assumption that the child involved 
will not develop strong ties with the country of nationality of the parent. In 
case of intercountry adoption, this is really different: the child will usually leave 
the country of origin and will grow up in another country, in most cases in the 
country of nationality of the adopting parent(s). This makes a positive differen-
tial treatment of acquisition of nationality by adoption desirable in those States 
where the intergenerational transfer of nationality is limited in case of birth 
82 Art. 8(2) RwNed. Regrettably, bill 33852 (R2023) pending in parliament since 28 January 2014 proposes to delete 
this facilitation. 
83 Art. 19(2) Cc esp.
84 See above para. 2.1.3.
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abroad.85 The choice to be made by a legislator of a country which provides for 
a limitation of acquisition of nationality iure filiationis in case of birth abroad, is 
whether in case of intercountry adoption no limitation should apply or whether 
the adopting parent will be granted the right to make a declaration of option of 
registration in favour of the acquisition of nationality by adoption.
2.2.4 Related grounds for acquisition and loss and related general issues
As mentioned above,86 a very much related ground for acquisition of nationality 
is the acquisition iure filiationis. In fact, the acquisition by adoption is itself an 
acquisition iure filiationis. 
A difficult situation arises if revocation or annulment of an adoption takes 
place.87According to Article 7(1)(f) ECN, this may not cause loss of national-
ity if the adopted child has already reached the age of majority. Furthermore, 
revocation or annulment shall never result in loss of nationality if statelessness 
would be the consequence.88 Recommendation 2009/13, however, goes further 
by providing in principle 15 that revocation or annulment of the adoption should 
not lead to a loss of nationality of a State acquired by the adoption if the child is 
already lawfully and habitually resident in that State for a period of more than 
five years. This principle – which is inspired by the overriding principle of the 
best interests of the child and the protection of legitimate expectations - reads 
as follows:
“15. provide that revocation or annulment of an adoption will not cause the per-
manent loss of the nationality acquired by the adoption, if the child is lawfully 
and habitually resident on their territory for a period of more than five years” 
The Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation 2009/13 89 mentions that 
in order to fulfil this principle, a State could provide that after a certain period 
of residence no loss occurs as a consequence of the revocation or annulment. 
However, it would also be in line with the principle if the annulment or revoca-
tion as such causes the loss of nationality but that the State concerned avoids a 
permanent loss of this nationality by providing for the immediate recovery of 
that nationality at the moment of loss, e.g. by a naturalisation already prepared 
beforehand. 
Another related ground for loss is loss due to loss of the family relationship 
which was the basis for the acquisition of nationality.90 
85 In this light I am not happy with the negative differential treatment of adopted children in the decision of the Ne-
therlands Council of State (Raad van State) 4 November 2015, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:3361. See my critical case note 
in Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2016, no. 4, p. 12-19.
86 See para. 2.1.4.
87 See para. 39 of the Explanatory Memorandum on Rec. 2009/13.
88 So also Art. 5 CRS 1961. See in the Eudo-citizenship database mode L13b.
89 See again para. 39 of the Explanatory Memorandum on Rec. 2009/13.
90 See Eudo-citizenship database mode L13a and hereinafter para. 2.5
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Due to the fact that adoption creates a parentage tie between the adopted child 
and the adopting parent(s), most States provide that the birth certificate of the 
adopted child will be amended. After the adoption, an extract from this birth 
certificate will indicate the adopting parents as parents without mentioning the 
fact of the adoption. If the rules on the acquisition of nationality by adoption are 
more narrow than the general rules on acquisition of nationality iure filiationis, 
this may cause difficulties if the authorities discover the fact of the adoption 
after having treated the child already for a considerable period as a national iure 
filiationis. There is then need for protection of legitimate expectations.91
2.2.5 An assessment of case 2
It is highly problematic not to provide for the acquisition of nationality of an 
adoptive parent by the adopted child under conditions identical to those applica-
ble to a normal ius sanguinis acquisition when the parentage tie established by 
an adoption realised abroad is recognised. As recommended by the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the (recognition of the) creation of the 
legal parentage tie between the adopted child and the adopting parent(s) should 
have the same nationality consequences as in case of the birth of a child to those 
parents. As the Special Commission on the practical operation of the Hague 
Adoption Convention pointed out, the nationality position of the adopted child 
should not rely on any action of the adopting parents. This is all the more impor-
tant because often these parents expect that the creation of the legal parentage 
ties between them and the child already implies the applicability of the rules on 
acquisition of nationality iure sanguinis of their State. 
Case 2 also illustrates that a State which wants to bring the nationality rules 
in accordance with international standards should pay appropriate attention 
to transitory provisions. The Netherlands lacked to do so, both in 1998 and in 
2006. This is particularly problematic because Netherlands nationality law does 
not honour legitimate expectations. This lack of protection of legitimate expec-
tations leads to situations which amount to arbitrary deprivation of nationality.
91 See hereinafter para. 2.7.
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2.3 Loss of nationality due to residence abroad
2.3.1 Case 3 Loss of nationality during pending nationality proceedings
Eveline and Frederique were born in Ghana respectively in 1978 and 1980 as 
children out of wedlock of a Ghanaian mother. In 1983 the mother married 
Govert Grutters, a man holding Netherlands nationality. In the same year she 
acquired Netherlands nationality by lodging a declaration of option.92 In 1985 
the principle of equal treatment of men and women was introduced in Neth-
erlands nationality law. Since then men and women can both transmit their 
Netherlands nationality to their children. Based on a transitory provision93 the 
mother lodged a declaration of option in favour of her daughters, who acquired 
by that declaration Netherlands nationality in 1985. Since around 1995 Eveline 
and Frederique wanted to travel to the Netherlands and apply for Netherlands 
passports. However, their applications were repeatedly rejected because they 
cannot submit the copies of their birth certificates which were used at the occa-
sion of lodging the option declaration in 1985. For that reason the authorities 
have doubts whether they are really Eveline and Frederique in favour of whom 
the option declaration was lodged in 1985. In 2012 they start proceedings in the 
Court of The Hague in order to get a court decision confirming their possession 
of Netherlands nationality. In November 2013 the Immigration and Naturali-
sation Department (hereinafter IND) as competent authority recognised that 
Eveline and Frederique had acquired Netherlands nationality by the declaration 
of option and also that the applicants are in fact the girls involved. However, 
the IND stated that they had lost Netherlands nationality on 1 April 2013 by 
residing ten years outside the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the European 
Union because they had not received before that day a Netherlands passport or 
a certificate of possession of Netherlands nationality. A letter sent to the lawyer 
of the girls by the IND with as topic “evidence of naturalisation” did not qual-
ify as a certificate of possession of Netherlands nationality. Moreover, starting 
proceedings in the Court of The Hague in order to receive a judicial confirma-
tion of the possession of Netherlands nationality also did not prevent the loss of 
nationality.94 
2.3.2 Relevant international standards
The idea that nationality should express a genuine link between a person and 
a State and that the loss of this link should also imply the loss of this status is 
expressed most clearly in provisions in nationality laws that provide for the loss 
of nationality for those citizens who permanently reside in another State.95 
92 Based on Art. 8 Wet op het Nederlanderschap en het ingezetenschap as in force until 1 January 1985.
93 Art. 27 RwNed as operative from 1985 until 1988.
94 The case description is based on the facts of the decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) of 
27 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:761. 
95 De Groot 1989, 290-295; Vink/ De Groot 2010a; SG UN 2013, A/HRC/25/28. para. 18. 
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Art. 7(1)(e) ECN explicitly allows for the loss of nationality because of a “lack 
of a genuine link between the State Party and a national habitually residing 
abroad”. However, this ground for loss may not cause statelessness.
The explanatory report on the ECN96 underscores that:
“Possible evidence of the lack of a genuine link may in particular be the omis-
sion of one of the following steps taken with the competent authorities of the 
State Party concerned: 
(i) registration; 
(ii) application for identity or travel documents
(iii) declaration expressing the desire to conserve the nationality of the State 
Party.”
The explanatory report97 also stresses that: 
“[i]t is presumed that the state concerned will have taken all reasonable meas-
ures to ensure that this information is communicated to the persons concerned.” 
The right to an administrative or judicial review (Art. 12 ECN) is in the explan-
atory report expressly underlined with regard to this ground for loss.98 Arguably, 
this implies that a judge could come to the conclusion that despite the formal 
criteria for the loss of citizenship having been fulfilled, there still is a genuine 
link between the respective State and the individual concerned.99 
Whereas the 1961 Convention originally accepted in Art. 7(3) that loss because 
of permanent residence abroad may, under exceptional circumstances, cause 
statelessness, the 2013 Tunis Conclusions on the interpretation of the Art. 5-9 
CRS 1961 underscore that a very restrictive interpretation of Art. 7(3) CRS in 
light of a proportionality test is necessary:
“There was a consensus that loss of nationality under Article 7(3) will gener-
ally not be permissible if the individual concerned is left stateless. Increasing 
international migration means that the character of the bond between the indi-
vidual and the State has considerably evolved and often involves only sporadic 
contact with the authorities and visits to the country of nationality. As a result, 
the objective of ensuring strong links between the individual and the State is less 
relevant than at the time of drafting of the 1961 Convention. Consequently, such 
provisions have become increasingly rare in nationality laws. In most cases, 
96 Explanatory report on the ECN, para. 71.
97 Explanatory report on the ECN, para. 70.
98 Explanatory report on the ECN, para. 72.
99 See also De Groot 2015; regrettably different: Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 27 March 2015, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2015:761, Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2015, nr. 259, p. 1215-1224 
 (with critical comment De Groot). Compare also Jessurun d’Oliveira 2016.
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loss of nationality resulting in statelessness will not meet the proportionality 
test because the impact on the individual far outweighs the objective sought by 
the State. 
The 1961 Convention indicates, moreover, that a naturalised person may not 
lose her or his citizenship based on this ground on account of residence abroad 
for a period of less than seven consecutive years (Article 7(4)). The European 
Convention does not specify such a minimum period of residence abroad and 
also does not restrict this ground to naturalised persons.”
In respect of the last sentence of this citation from the Tunis Conclusions, it has 
to be stressed that the ECN is generally against a different treatment of nationals 
by birth and nationals who acquired their nationality later in their life.100
Regarding the loss of nationality due to residence abroad Resolution III, adopt-
ed during the final conference where the CRS 1961 was signed, has to be men-
tioned:
“The Conference recommends Contracting States making the retention of na-
tionality by their nationals abroad subject to a declaration or registration to 
take all possible steps to ensure that such persons are informed in time of the 
formalities and time limits to be observed if they are to retain their nationality.” 
101
In light of the standards just described - and with due regard to the right of free 
movement of European citizens within the European Union - the ILEC Guide-
lines 2015102 conclude in respect of this ground for loss inter alia:
“Member States may only consider that residence abroad may lead to loss of 
their nationality provided the following principles are observed:
a) Loss of nationality on the grounds of residence abroad should never cause 
statelessness;
b) Loss of nationality should not apply in case of residence in another Member 
State of the European Union;
c) Loss of nationality should not apply only to naturalised citizens;
d) All relevant circumstances should be taken into account, in particular all 
indications of existing links with the state involved;
e) Member States have an obligation to inform the person concerned explicitly 
and individually about the steps to be taken in order to avoid loss of nationality 
due to residence abroad. Member States should use a ‘deprivation’ construction 
rather than an ‘automatic loss’ approach.
100 Art. 5(2) ECN.
101 Compare the explanatory report on the ECN, para. 72, already cited above.
102 Para. IV.2.
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f) If loss of nationality due to residence abroad can be prevented by a declara-
tion, the application for a passport or identity card should suffice; if such decla-
ration should be made within a certain period, this period should be longer than 
the period of validity of a passport or identity card;
g) In the context of checking the proportionality of a deprivation decision, it is 
appropriate to distinguish between the first generation born abroad and further 
generations born abroad.”
2.3.3 Choices to be made
In light of the standards described above in para. 2.3.1, a State which wants to 
provide for loss of nationality in cases of permanent residence abroad has to 
do so in a way that allows taking into account all relevant circumstances in the 
context of a proportionality test. Due to the necessary assessment of the pro-
portionality, it is definitely wise to prefer the construction of a deprivation of 
nationality to an ex lege loss.103 
Furthermore, it has to be regulated how the nationals involved will be informed 
in time about the formalities and time limits to be observed if they want to retain 
their nationality. This should include confirmation of the number of years of res-
idence abroad the loss may occur and also whether the ground for loss can only 
operate in case of residence abroad during the relevant number of years counted 
from the moment of attaining the age of majority or also after this number of 
years of residence abroad later in life. A disadvantage of this choice also apply-
ing this ground for loss after residence abroad at a later moment in life104 is that 
it may cause the loss of nationality of older nationals who are no longer able to 
care for their own interests and are dependent on actions of relatives or friends. 
Moreover, a State has to realise that the application of this ground for loss at a 
late moment of life of a person may have consequences for the right to impose 
succession taxes after the death of the person involved.105
2.3.4 Related grounds for acquisition and loss and related general issues
A related ground for acquisition is limitation of acquisition in case of birth 
abroad106 (see above para. 2.1.2). Another related ground for acquisition is the 
recovery of nationality (reacquisition of nationality by a former national)107: if a 
former national who lost the nationality by residence abroad may simply reac-
quire this nationality by registration, this may influence the result of the applica-
tion of the proportionality test.108
103 De Groot 2015; Jessurun d’Oliveira 2016.
104 As provided by e.g. Art. 15(1)(c) RwNed. Compare Eudo-citizenship database mode L02.
105 Compare e.g. for the Netherlands Art. 3 (1) Successiewet.
106 Eudo-citizenship database mode A01b.
107 Eudo-citizenship database mode A16. 
108 Compare Sect. 13(1) BNA, which allows a former national who lost his citizenship by declaration of renunciation 
to reacquire British citizenship by registration.
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For all grounds of loss procedural issues are of paramount importance. No 
ground for loss should have arbitrary effects. The proportionality of the loss of 
nationality should be established beyond any reasonable doubt.109 
2.3.5 An assessment of case 3
In light of the international standards described above, all circumstances have 
to be taken into account in order to assess whether a genuine link still exists 
between a national residing abroad and the State of nationality. For that reason 
the construction of a possible deprivation of nationality has to be preferred to 
an ex lege loss of nationality due to permanent residence abroad. It would be 
welcomed if the legislator of the Netherlands would change the current ground 
for loss accordingly. Moreover, the list of documents which can prevent the loss 
of nationality due to residence abroad does not include some acts or facts which 
demonstrate beyond any doubt that the person involved wants to continue to be 
a Netherlands national. For example, the application for issuing a Netherlands 
passport or a certificate of the possession of Netherlands nationality, respective-
ly initiating court proceeding in order to get a judicial confirmation of the pos-
session of Netherlands nationality are lacking. This type of acts or facts should 
be inserted in the list of documents which prevent the loss of nationality. A 
judge confronted with case 3 could also decide that the list of documents is not 
exhaustive. Not doing so and instead concluding that Netherlands nationality 
is lost –as the Netherlands Supreme Court did- could be qualified as arbitrary 
deprivation of nationality.110 
109 See hereinafter para. 2.6.
110 See my very critical case note under the decision of the Supreme Court of 27 March 2015 in Jurisprudentie Vreem-
delingenrecht 2015, no. 259, p. 1215-1224. 
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111 Bill 34356 (R2064).
112 Kingdom Act of 5 March 2016, Staatsblad 2016, 121, in force on 31 March 2016.
113 “[…] zich of een ander opzettelijk gelegenheid, middelen of inlichtingen verschaft of tracht te verschaffen tot het 
plegen van een terroristisch misdrijf dan wel een misdrijf ter voorbereiding of vergemakkelijking van een terroristisch 
misdrijf, dan wel zich kennis of vaardigheden daartoe verwerft of een ander bijbrengt”.
2.4  Loss of nationality due to activities seriously prejudicial to the vital 
interests of the State
2.4.1 Case 4 Deprivation of nationality of terrorist fighters
In December 2015 the Netherlands Minister of Security and Justice sent a bill 
to parliament proposing to introduce the possibility of deprivation of nationality 
in case of participation in a terrorist organisation.111 The Minister would be 
allowed to take such a deprivation decision on the basis of information (i.a. of 
the secret services) on participation in a terrorist organisation. The deprivation 
may not cause statelessness. For that reason this measure can only be taken if 
the person is a dual or multiple national. The goal of the proposed measure is 
the protection of the security of the Netherlands against a terrorist threat. The 
explanatory memorandum accompanying the bill stresses that the proposed pos-
sibility of deprivation is no sanction under criminal law, but an administrative 
measure to protect public safety.
The proposed measure would be in addition to the possibility of deprivation 
of nationality of a person who, since 2010, was sentenced because of having 
committed a crime seriously prejudicial to the vital interest of the State and 
punishable with imprisonment of 8 years or more. That possibility is enshrined 
in art. 14 (2) Netherlands Nationality Act (Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap), 
which refers to the relevant articles of the Criminal Code. Art. 14(2) was recent-
ly112 amended so as to include also the delict of Art. 134a Criminal Code, deal-
ing with several kinds of preparatory acts for committing a terrorist crime.113 
To determine the scope of application of the proposed possibility to deprive 
someone of his or her nationality, it is of course highly relevant which organ-
isations would be classified as having a terrorist aim. The bill provides that 
the Minister will publish a list of relevant organisations after consultation of 
Council of Ministers of the Kingdom. The explanatory memorandum indicates 
that the PKK, FARC and Tamil Tigers will not be put on this list, whereas Islamic 
State and Al-Qaida will.
The bill explicitly regulates the possibility of judicial review by the Court of The 
Hague or if the person involved is resident in the Caribbean part of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands the Court of Aruba, respectively Curaçao or St Maarten. From 
a decision of the Court of the Hague appeal is possible to the Council of State 
(Raad van State) or in the Carribean part of the Kingdom the possibility of appeal 
to the Common Court of Justice (Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie) will be giv-
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en. However, challenging the deprivation decision taken by the Minister will not 
have any suspensive effect, as the deprivation works immediately. The overall goal 
of the measure is to apply the power of deprivation to nationals residing abroad 
in order to hinder their return to the Netherlands, due to the fact that the persons 
involved are deemed to be a threat to the security of the Netherlands.
2.4.2 Relevant international standards
Several States maintain a general ground for loss of nationality due to disloyalty, 
treason, violation of ‘duties as a national’, or similar behaviour that is consid-
ered to be seriously prejudicial to the interests of the State involved.114 Art. 7(1)
(d) ECN mentions conduct in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests 
of the State Party as a separate ground for loss. The wording of that provision 
is drawn from Article 8(3)(a)(ii) of the 1961 CRS. It is remarkable that the re-
lated provisions from Article 8(3)(a)(i) (in disregard of an express prohibition 
rendering services to or receiving emoluments from another State) and 8(3)(b) 
CRS (taking an oath or making a formal declaration of allegiance to another 
State or giving definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance 
with the State involved) are not included in the ECN. For that reason, it should 
be concluded that these acts do not constitute behaviour seriously prejudicial to 
the vital interests of a State under the ECN. The explanatory report on the ECN 
is silent on this point. 
However, it stresses that the conduct involved includes notably treason and other 
activities directed against the vital interests of the State concerned, for example 
work for a foreign secret service, but does not include criminal offences of a 
general nature, however serious they may be.115 
The ECN does not allow this ground for loss to cause statelessness. For that 
reason only dual or multiple nationals are at risk of being deprived of their na-
tionality.116 Art. 8(3) CRS 1961 stipulates that conduct seriously prejudicial to 
the vital interests of the State can exceptionally constitute a ground for depriva-
tion of nationality with statelessness as consequence, but only if it is an existing 
ground for deprivation in the internal law of the State concerned, which, at the 
time of signature, ratification or accession, the State specifies it will retain.117 
Art. 8(4) CRS 1961 stipulates a fair hearing by an independent body, whereas 
also the ECN prescribes to provide reasons in writing and access to a court.118
It has to be mentioned that provisions dealing with this ground of loss are often 
problematic with regard to the unequal treatment of citizens, for example, if 
only naturalised citizens – but not ‘natural born’ citizens - can be deprived of 
114 De Groot 1989, 301, 295-298; De Groot/ Vink 2014, para. 5 and Table 3.4.
115 Explanatory Report on the ECN, para. 87.
116 See De Groot/ Vink 2014, para. 5 and the fifth column of Table 34.
117 10 of the 65 Contracting States made such a declaration of retention.
118 See on these procedural safeguards hereinafter para. 2.6.
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nationality. Such an exclusive application to naturalised citizens is in violation 
of Art. 5(2) ECN. But also if States apply these loss regulations only to dual citi-
zens, there is a serious problem if the nationals involved are not able to renounce 
their other nationality and are for that reason dual nationals against their will. 
Countries which do not allow renunciation of nationality are - next a number of 
States in Latin America119 and Oceania120 - mainly Arab States.121 The question 
then arises, whether such regulations of loss are discriminatory for dual nation-
als with roots in that part of the world. 
In light of the standards and the problems just mentioned the ILEC Guidelines 
2015 recommend in respect of this ground for loss122: 
“Member States may only consider that undesirable behaviour may lead to loss 
of their nationality provided the following principles are observed:
a) Loss of nationality due to undesirable behaviour (e.g. acts seriously prejudi-
cial to the vital interests of the State or foreign military service) should never 
cause statelessness ;
b) Due to the paramount importance of the proportionality principle, loss of 
nationality due to undesirable behaviour should never occur automatically, but 
always by deprivation through means of an explicit decision by competent au-
thorities;
c) The unacceptable character of the undesirable behaviour of the person in-
volved should be proven beyond any reasonable doubt. Such behaviour should 
constitute a crime and a criminal court should have imposed a sanction;”
A strong caveat regarding deprivation of nationality due to activities seriously 
prejudicial to the vital interests of the State can also be found in a report sent 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Human Rights Council. 
The report observes that many provisions dealing with this ground for depriva-
tion are rather general in scope, which makes this ground for loss a potential 
source of legal insecurity. Furthermore, depending on the exact formulation of 
these grounds for loss, they can constitute a danger for human rights norms, 
in particular the freedom of speech.123 The danger of too open formulas is also 
recognised by several countries that do not apply this ground for loss, based on 
historical experiences with authoritarian regimes. Their Constitutions contain 
explicit provisions that citizens should not be deprived of their citizenship be-
cause of their behaviour, often with the exception of deprivation of nationality 
119 Argentina, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay. Howe-
ver, some of these countries allow for loss of nationality of some categories of nationals, in particular for naturalised 
persons. See Bijlage 1 belonging to the comment on Art. 9 in the Handleiding voor de toepassing van de Rijkswet op 
het Nederlanderschap and compare the information on Eudo-citizenship database mode L01. 
120 Nauru and Tonga. See the Bijlage 1, mentioned in the previous footnote.
121 Algeria, Bangladesh, Iran, Libya, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. See Bijlage 1, as mentioned above. 
122 ILEC Guidelines, IV.3. Compare also the Tunis Conclusions, para. 15-24.
123 SG UN 2013, A/HRC/25/28, para. 13.
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due to fraud committed during the naturalisation procedure.124 Nevertheless, we 
find this ground for loss in around half of the States.125
2.4.3 Choices to be made
A State wishing to provide for this ground of loss should realise that the depri-
vation of nationality may cause problems for international criminal jurisdiction 
of courts in respect of acts committed by the person whose nationality is taken 
away.126 The deprivation of nationality may also constitute an impediment as to 
the enforcement of criminal court sentences against the person concerned. This 
is highly problematic in light of the obligation to prosecute effectively interna-
tional crimes such as terrorist acts.127
If the deprivation of nationality happens in order to be able to expel the person 
concerned, this may also be questionable because of the fact that deprivation of 
nationality “for the sole purpose of expelling him or her” is not allowed by the 
2014 ILC Draft Articles on the expulsion of aliens.128
Deprivation of nationality due to behaviour seriously prejudicial to the vital in-
terests of the State may also cause the export of risks. Persons deprived of their 
nationality will likely permanently join the “international army of terrorists”. If 
they still possess the nationality of another State, they may go to the country of 
that (other) nationality which could result in a heightened political and security 
risk in that country. This is highly problematic in light of the international soli-
darity which is essential in the war against terrorism.
Moreover, if only dual nationals can be deprived of their citizenship on this 
ground, due to the fact that no statelessness should be the consequence, this may 
cause a race between the States concerned in order to be quicker than the other 
State in respect of this type of deprivation procedures.
There may also be a tension with the “ne bis in idem” principle as applicable 
in criminal law:129 the deprivation of nationality may be classified as a second 
sanction on the basis of the same facts.
Given the fact that several persons engaged in terrorist activities in particular 
in Iraq and Syria went to these countries with their families, a State which de-
prives a national of her or his nationality should also realise that this deprivation 
124 See for example German Basic Law: Art. 16(1), Polish Constitution: Art. 34(2)).
125 Manby 2015, 175, 176; Vonk 2014; database Eudocitizenship mode L07 (disloyalty and treason) .
126 Compare the bad experiences in the Netherlands with the prosecution of former Netherlands nationals who lost 
their nationality by military service in the German army during WW II. See De Groot/ Vonk 2015.
127 Goodwin-Gill 2014, 13-15.
128 Art. 8 of the 2014 ILC Draft Articles on the expulsion of aliens: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
commentaries/9_12_2014.pdf; see also Goodwin-Gill 2014, 11; Lambert 2015, 15.
129 Compare the decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad) 3 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:434; 
NJ 2015, 558. 
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should –according to the international standards - not have consequences for 
the nationality of her or his children. The children born before the deprivation 
became effective will still continue to be nationals. They may ask for diplomatic 
or consular protection and ask for travel documents which enable them to travel 
to their country of nationality.
For European States deprivation of nationality may also violate the right to re-
spect private and family life under Art. 8 ECHR.130 
2.4.4 Related grounds for acquisition and loss and related general issues
Related grounds for loss are foreign military service131 and foreign state service.132 
Whereas the 1997 ECN allows States to provide for loss of nationality in case of 
foreign military service, this is not the case for foreign state service. In extreme 
cases the foreign military or state service may constitute behaviour seriously 
prejudicial against the vital interests of the State. 
For all grounds of loss procedural issues are of paramount importance. No ground 
for loss should have arbitrary effects. The proportionality of the loss of nationality 
should be established beyond any reasonable doubt. See hereinafter para. 2.6
2.4.5 An assessment of case 4133
First of all, the goal of the proposal made by the bill sent to the parliament of the 
Netherlands in December 2015 is unclear. Is it a preventive measure or a reaction 
on behaviour seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State? The depri-
vation of nationality as a preventive measure evidently violates the international 
standards!!! Deprivation based on behaviour seriously prejudicial to the vital in-
terest of the State is allowed, although the nationality legislation of the Nether-
lands already provides for this ground for deprivation in Art. 14 (2) RwNed.
Second, there is a huge risk of discrimination of Netherlands nationals with 
dual/ multiple nationality, in particular of persons who are not able to renounce 
their other nationality. The proposed possible deprivation will be in particular a 
threat for Netherlands nationals with roots in the Arab world.
Third, ISIS and Al Qaida will be put on the black list of terrorist organisations, 
but FARC, PKK and Tamil Tigers will not. The reason for this is that the latter 
organisations do not pose a threat to the security of the Netherlands. This may 
be true, but is this not at least an appearance of discrimination?
130 Goodwin-Gill 2014; Lambert 2015, 15.
131 Eudo-citizenship database mode L03.
132 Eudo-citizenship database mode L04.
133 See also the discussion on EUDO CITIZENSHIP on “The Return of Banishment: Do the New Denationalisa-
tion Policies Weaken Citizenship?”, available on http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-forum/1268-
the-return-of-banishment-do-the-new-denationalisation-policies-weaken-citizenship. See also SG UN 2013, A/
HRC/25/28, para. 13; De Groot/ Vonk 2015 and 2016; Wautelet 2015 and 2016.
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Fourth, the regulation of the judicial control is rather weak. Why was it not pro-
posed to put the deprivation directly in de hands of the courts? Why should there 
be different courts of last resort for the Netherlands, respectively the Caribbean 
part of the Kingdom? Why is a provision on the suspensive effect of the appeal 
lacking? Why is there no previous criminal procedure prescribed? Why is it 
not regulated how to deal precisely with information submitted by the secrete 
services? And is it allowed to refuse the person involved to return to the Nether-
lands, if he wants to be present during the court procedure assessing the depri-
vation of his Netherlands nationality?
Fifth, deprivation of nationality weakens the international criminal jurisdiction 
of the courts in the Netherlands. 
Sixth, loss of nationality due to behaviour seriously prejudicial to the vital in-
terest of the State may not be extended to minor children of the person whose 
nationality is lost by the act of deprivation. These minors will therefore continue 
to be nationals and have the right to return to the Netherlands. Netherlands em-
bassies and consulates can also be confronted with the request of these children 
to give diplomatic and consular protection.
 
To sum up, many arguments can be advanced against the proposal. Special at-
tention has to be paid to the risk of discrimination and the very weak procedural 
safeguards. Non-discrimination and strong procedural safeguards are core val-
ues of our society. They should not be sacrificed because of the threat of terrorist 
attacks.
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2.5 Loss of nationality due to loss of family relationship
2.5.1 Case 5 A successful denial of paternity
Hans Helders, sixteen years old, was born in Escondido (California, Unit-
ed States) as the son of the American Jane Johnson and her husband Karel 
Koenders. He acquired both American citizenship and Netherlands nationality. 
Hans grew up in California, but came to Europe two years ago because his 
father got a very good job offer in Berlin (Germany). Hans is attending the in-
ternational school in Berlin, where he is doing very well.
 
However, he has recently experienced tremendous difficulties to concentrate on 
his studies as a result of the disturbing news he received about his parents. Three 
months ago, he received a message from his father from which he learned that 
Karel is in fact not his biological father. It seems that his mother has conceded 
that Hans was fathered by Leonard Lampe, an American living in Ohio. Karel is 
extremely upset about this information and wanted to have Hans’ collaboration 
for a DNA-test. Having done so, Hans recently received a copy of the DNA-re-
port, which comes to the conclusion that with a certainty of 99,999 % Karel is 
not his biological father. Karel announced that he now will start legal proceed-
ings in order to challenge his legal paternity of Hans.
Apart from the psychological stress caused by these messages, Hans is also ex-
tremely worried about the legal consequences of a successful denial of paternity. 
If he is not the son of a Netherlands father anymore, will he still be a Nether-
lands national and therefore a European citizen? 
With the assistance of a good friend, he asks information at the embassy of the 
Netherlands in Berlin. To his huge disappointment he receives the answer that 
his Netherlands nationality and consequently his European citizenship will be 
lost in case the successful denial of paternity procedure will become final before 
he reaches the age of eighteen years.134
2.5.2 Relevant international standards
Given that nationality is often automatically acquired because a parent is a na-
tional (iure filiationis), this acquisition is seriously undermined if it becomes 
evident that the assumed family relationship never existed, for example in case 
of an ex tunc effect of a judicial confirmation following a denial of maternity or 
paternity,135 if the family relationship ends because of annulment or revocation 
of adoption, or if it ends because of adoption.136 Art. 7(1)(f) and 7(1)(g) ECN 
and Art. 5 of the 1961 CRS allow in those cases to provide for the loss, except 
if statelessness would be caused. Art. 7 ECN stipulates also that this ground 
134 The case description is based on an e-mail I received from the lawyer of the son and his mother.
135 E.g. in case of a successful challenge of the presumption “pater est quem matrimonium demonstrat.”
136 De Groot 1989, 301-303.
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for loss should not apply if the person involved has already reached the age of 
majority.
It is remarkable that only a few States regulate this ground for loss express-
ly.137 However, it is even more striking that in countries that do not mention this 
ground for loss specifically in their legislation, it is not always clear whether this 
implies that no such ground for loss exists.138 This is highly problematic in light 
of the fact that arbitrary deprivation of nationality is forbidden.139 The lack of a 
clear legal basis for a certain mode of loss of nationality implies arbitrariness: 
Nulla perditio sine praevia lege.140
Recommendation 2009/13 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Eu-
rope on the position of children in nationality law is also relevant in case of loss 
of the family relationship which was the basis for the acquisition of nationality. 
Member States are recommended to:
“ provide that children who were treated in good faith as their nationals for 
a specific period of time should not be declared as not having acquired their 
nationality”
The Explanatory Memorandum on this principle underline:
“43. Article 7, paragraph 1 (f) of the ECN provides for the loss of nationality in 
cases of non-fulfilment of the preconditions, which led to the acquisition of the 
nationality ex lege, during the minority of the person involved. Several different 
situations are covered by this provision: firstly, the provision applies to situa-
tions where a child has acquired a nationality as a foundling and later, after 
discovery of his or her parent(s), appears to have the nationality of the parent(s) 
jure sanguinis. Secondly, the rule also applies in the event that a child has ac-
quired the nationality of his or her state of birth because he or she would have 
otherwise been stateless, but further evidence shows that he or she had also 
acquired another nationality jure sanguinis. In both cases, the loss involved is a 
correction of a default jus soli acquisition. 
44. But the loss can also be the consequence of a retroactive (ex tunc) loss of the 
family relationship on which the acquisition of nationality jure sanguinis was 
based, for example because of a successful denial of paternity, annulment of a 
recognition of paternity or an ex tunc annulment of an adoption. 
[…]
46. Article 7 of the ECN limits this type of loss of nationality in two ways. Firstly, 
no loss should take place on this ground after the person involved has reached 
the age of majority. Secondly, statelessness should not be the consequence. 
137 De Groot/ Vink 2014, para. 7. See Eudo-citizenship database mode L11.
138 De Groot/ Wautelet 2014, para. 3.2.
139 De Groot/ Wautelet 2014, para. 4.3.
140 De Groot 2013c, para. 6.
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47. In the past few years serious doubts have arisen in several states regarding 
the age limit mentioned in Article 7, paragraph 1 (f) of the ECN. It is doubtful 
that the loss of nationality can still be justified when the child involved has been, 
in a completely legal way, in possession of a nationality for a considerable num-
ber of years. This is in particular the case if the child was treated as a national 
for a period exceeding the period of residence required for naturalisation, which 
according to Article 6, paragraph 3 of the ECN should not exceed ten years. 
Furthermore, the desirable preferential treatment of children could even justify a 
much shorter limit. This principle does not prescribe a certain maximum period 
after which the non (or no longer) fulfilment of the preconditions for the acqui-
sition should not have consequences. Domestic law has to specify the required 
period of time. However, it is obvious that this period should be shorter than 18 
years (see Article 7, paragraph 4 (f) of the ECN).”
In respect of this ground for loss the ILEC Guidelines 2015 formulate the fol-
lowing recommendations141:
a) If a State provides that the loss of a family relationship is ground for the loss 
of nationality, in specific circumstances, it should provide so expressly in its na-
tionality law and regulate the conditions and limits of its application;
b) Loss of nationality due to the loss of a family relationship should never cause 
statelessness;
c) In light of the proportionality principle and the desirability of the protection 
of legitimate expectations a limitation period is desirable. The required period 
should be shorter than the residence period required for naturalisation and also 
shorter than the limitation period which may exist in the state involved for dep-
rivation of citizenship based on fraud;
d) The protection mechanisms (no statelessness; limitation period) should not 
only apply in cases where the family relationship legally existed, but was an-
nulled, but also in cases where it is discovered that the family relationship never 
legally existed.
2.5.3 Choices to be made
If a State wants to provide this ground for loss it has to regulate the limits of its 
application.
A rather short limitation period is appropriate, which should be shorter than the 
limitation period which may exist for deprivation of nationality based on fraud. 
It is completely unreasonable that the loss of nationality due to loss of a family 
relationship can occur after a longer possession of nationality in good faith than 
in case of possession of nationality in bad faith due to committing fraud during 
the acquisition procedure. It is also difficult to understand why the limitation 
period should be longer than the residence period required for naturalisation. 
141 ILEC Guidelines 2015, IV.3. Compare also De Groot 2015.
38
Moreover, one should realise that the child involved did build up ties with the 
country of his nationality and will have the expectation to continue to be a na-
tional. For these reasons, countries like Finland142 and Germany143 provide for an 
age limit of five years in respect of this ground for loss. Finland also explicitly 
takes into account additional considerations, such as the ties between the target 
person and the country involved.
This limitation exists in Germany since 2009 and was introduced after the 
Constitutional Court ruled that a short limitation period had to be introduced.144 
An exception to the limitation to the age of five years applies in cases where the 
recognition of paternity is annulled by a court on application of the authorities 
because this recognition happened for immigration law purposes.145 However, 
this annulment is not possible if a “sozial-familiäre Beziehung” (socio-familial 
relationship)146 exists between the father and the child. Otherwise the annulment 
of paternity and the consequential loss of nationality would constitute a viola-
tion of Art. 8 ECHR.
Of course a State also has to regulate whether the loss happens ex lege if it is 
established that the family relationship which led to the acquisition of nation-
ality does no longer exist and this happens before completion of the applicable 
limitation period. However, if a State also wants to take other considerations into 
account – like e.g. Finland – a deprivation procedure has to be chosen.
2.5.4 Related grounds for acquisition and loss and related general issues
The closest related ground for acquisition is of course the acquisition iure filia-
tionis (see above para. 2.1). 
Related grounds for loss are not meeting the grounds which were the basis of the 
acquisition ( e.g. discovery of possession of another nationality, in case of a de-
fault acquisition of nationality iure soli by a foundling)147 and loss of nationality 
due to revocation or annulment of adoption.148
As for all grounds of loss of nationality procedural issues are essential. Arbitrary 
effects are forbidden and the proportionality of the loss must be beyond any rea-
sonable doubt. With this ground for loss, the best interests of the child should be 
paramount and will often have to lead to protection of legitimate expectations.149
142 Par. 32 Kansalaisuuslaki (Finish Nationality Act).
143 Para. 17(3) StAG.
144 German Constitutional Court Decision: BVerfG, 2 BvR 696/04 of 24.10.2006. See De Groot and Schneider 2007, 
79-102.
145 See Para. 1600 (1) 5 and 1600 (3) in combination with 1592 (2) BGB (German Civil Code).
146 This expression obviously refers to the concept of ‘family life’ in the sense of Art. 8(1) ECHR.
147 Compare Eudo-citizenship database mode A03a.
148 Eudo-citizenship database mode L13b. See also above para. 2.2.
149 See hereinafter par 2.7.
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2.5.5 An assessment of case 5
According to the nationality law of the Netherlands, Netherlands nationality is 
lost if the parentage relation which constitutes the ground for the acquisition of 
Netherlands nationality is annulled during the minority of the child involved, 
e.g. by a successful denial of paternity. No loss occurs, if the child would other-
wise become stateless (Art. 14 (4) RwNed). This rule is in line with Art. 7(1)(f) 
ECN, but problematic in light of the recommendations of the ILEC guidelines. 
The Netherlands legislator should revisit the current regulation of this ground 
for loss in light of the ILEC guidelines and the recent reforms in Finland and 
Germany.
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2.6 Procedural safeguards
2.6.1 Case 6 Deprivation of nationality due to identity fraud
Marlene Erdene came as a minor with her mother from Mongolia to the Neth-
erlands in the 1990s and received a residence permit. In 2007 she successfully 
applied for naturalisation. However, in 2007 the Immigration and Naturalisa-
tion Department (IND) received information that Marlene had not entered the 
Netherlands under her real name. Her real name is Migeddorjiin Bat-Erdene.150 
Furthermore, her date of birth as mentioned in her residence permit and in the 
Royal Decree granting naturalisation was not correct (8 Januari 1981 instead 
of 10 October 1981). In 2010 the Minister of Justice concluded that applying for 
naturalisation while submitting wrong personal data constituted fraud commit-
ted during the naturalisation procedure and that for that reason the naturalisa-
tion decree could be annulled under the operation of Art. 14 (1) Rijkswet op het 
Nederlanderschap. In respect of the proportionality of that decision it was ar-
gued that applying for naturalisation using false personal data is such a serious 
case of fraud that deprivation of nationality by annulment of the naturalisation 
is appropriate and proportional. Although the decision of the Minister can be 
challenged in court, the decision has immediate effect, i.e. Netherlands nation-
ality is lost and during the court proceedings the person involved is treated as 
a foreigner.151
2.6.2 Relevant international standards
In order to enhance everyone’s right to a nationality and in order to implement 
the ban on arbitrary deprivation as enshrined in Art. 15 UDHR, procedural safe-
guards are essential.152 For decisions on deprivation of nationality this is already 
recognised by Art. 8 (4) CRS 1961, which provides:
“A Contracting State shall not exercise a power of deprivation permitted
by paragraphs 2 or 3 of this Article except in accordance with law, which shall
provide for the person concerned the right to a fair hearing by a court or other
independent body.”
However, it is evident that procedural safeguards are also of paramount impor-
tance for cases of ex lege loss of nationality. Moreover, procedural safeguards 
are likewise essential in order to guarantee a fair and non-discriminatory access 
to nationality. This is in particular the case if a person claims to have acquired a 
150 This Mongolian name is invented, but is chosen in a way which enabled me to illustrate the differences between 
the real name of the applicant in the case involved and the name used by her. Although the name of the applicant 
does not appear in the decision of the Council of State as published online, the real name and the names used by the 
applicant are known to me.
151 The case description is based on a decision of the Council of State (Raad van State) as Supreme Administrative 
Court of the Netherlands of 11 December 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:2401, Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2014, 
no. 66, p. 338-342 and the Court of Maastricht 6 March 2013, ECLI:NL:RBLIM:2013:919. See also Chun Luk, in 
Carrera Nuñez / De Groot 2015, 493, 494. Note that the names used in the case description have been changed.
152 SG UN 2009. Compare also Brandvoll 2014 and Molnár 2014.
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nationality ex lege according the rules of the State concerned or if (s)he is enti-
tled to be registered as national by e.g. the exercise of an option right. If such a 
person would not have the right to ask a judicial review of her or his nationality 
position after the authorities refuse to recognise her or him as a national, this 
would amount to arbitrary deprivation of nationality.153 However, if one wants to 
guarantee that everybody who has built up a genuine link with a country should 
have a fair and non-discriminatory access to the nationality of that State and 
arbitrary denial of naturalisation should be impossible, also negative decisions 
on applications for naturalisation must be open for judicial review.
That procedural safeguards should exist for all decisions on the nationality posi-
tion of a person is firmly recognised by the ECN 1997. The drafters of the ECN 
also realised that a judicial review without having a right to receive a written de-
cision would run empty. Moreover, it is of importance to avoid that the exercise 
of a right to have a judicial review would be hindered by unreasonable fees.154 
The relevant articles read as follows:
“Ar t ic le  11 – Decis ions
Each State Party shall ensure that decisions relating to the acquisition, reten-
tion, loss, recovery or certification of its nationality contain reasons in writing.
Article  12 – Right  to  a  review
Each State Party shall ensure that decisions relating to the acquisition, reten-
tion, loss, recovery or certification of its nationality be open to an administrative 
or judicial review in conformity with its internal law.
Article  13 – Fees
[…] 
2 Each State Party shall ensure that the fees for an administrative or judicial 
review be not an obstacle for applicants.”
Regrettably, the ECN allows to make reservations in respect to these articles and 
some Contracting States did.155 However, it follows from case law of the ECJ 
and the ECtHR that at least in cases of loss of nationality156 and in cases where it 
is claimed that the access to nationality is denied on discriminatory grounds157, 
not having access to a judge would violate European law, respectively the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. 
153 Compare De Groot/ Swider/ Vonk 2015, para. 5.2.
154 Furthermore, there should not be a risk that applicants are liable to pay the costs incurred by the State in case of an 
unsuccessful procedure. See the ILEC Guidelines, III.3.
155 Denmark made a reservation on Art. 12 for decisions on naturalisation and Hungary made a reservation on Art. 11 
and 12 for decisions relating to requests to acquire nationality. 
156 See ECJ 2 March 2010 in Rottmann which prescribes a proportionality test, which implies that a judicial review 
must be possible. See De Groot/ Seling 2011; Shaw 2011
157 See ECtHR 11 October 2011 in Genovese v Malta. See De Groot/ Vonk 2012.
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In December 2009, the Secretary General of the United Nations, in a report deal-
ing with arbitrary deprivation of nationality, which was sent to the UN Human 
Rights Council, asked that attention be given to procedural safeguards:158
“Procedural safeguards are essential to prevent abuse of the law. States are 
thus expected to observe minimum procedural standards in order to ensure that 
decisions on nationality matters do not contain any element of arbitrariness. 
For example, according to article 17 of the International Law Commission’s 
draft articles on the nationality of natural persons [in case of state succession; 
GRdG], decisions relating to acquisition, retention or renunciation of nationali-
ty should be issued in writing and be open to effective administrative or judicial 
review. These elements, according to the Commission, “represent minimum re-
quirements in this respect”.
The International Law Commission also stated in the above-mentioned com-
mentary on the draft articles that the review process could be carried out by a 
competent jurisdiction of an administrative or judicial nature in conformity with 
the internal law of each State. The Commission clarified that the term “effec-
tive” was intended to stress the fact that an opportunity had to be provided to 
permit meaningful review of relevant substantive issues;[…]
it could thus be understood in the same sense as in article 2, paragraph 3 (a), of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where the same word 
is used.
Moreover, the Commission stressed that the word “judicial” should be under-
stood as covering both civil and administrative jurisdictions.”
In his report to the Human Rights Council of December 2013, the Secretary 
General underscored furthermore:159
“Where a person is subject to loss or deprivation of nationality and a review 
process is available, lodging an appeal should suspend the effects of the de-
cision, such that the individual continues to enjoy nationality — and related 
rights — until such time as the appeal has been settled. Access to the appeals 
process may become problematic and related due process guarantees nullified if 
the loss or deprivation of nationality is not suspended and the former national, 
now alien, is expelled. Similarly, if withdrawal of nationality results in the loss of 
property rights, the individual may have to forfeit his home or business, as well 
as other acquired rights — an interference which may be difficult to repair if it is 
subsequently established that the loss or deprivation of nationality was unlawful 
or arbitrary and must be reversed.”160
158 SG UN 2009, para. 43, 44.
159 SG UN 2013, para. 31 and 33.
160 See also the 2013 Tunis Conclusions, para. 26 and 27. 
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In line with the just described documents the ILEC Guidelines 2015 provide the 
following procedural guidelines:161
“Banning arbitrary deprivation and the necessity of applying a proportionality 
test imply that adequate procedural safeguards are essential. These safeguards 
apply in all cases of loss and deprivation, including in cases where authorities 
conclude that a given person never acquired a nationality.
1.  All decisions relating to the loss and deprivation of nationality need to be 
provided in writing, and have to contain explicit reasons for the deprivation.
2.  All decisions relating to the loss or deprivation of nationality should be open to ju-
dicial review, i.e. access to an independent judge leading to a reasoned decision;
3.  The fees for judicial review should not be an obstacle for applicants. Appli-
cants should not be held liable to pay the costs incurred by the State, even if 
they fail to successfully challenge the deprivation.
4.  During the procedure, applicants should be treated as nationals; this treatment 
should be afforded during appeals procedure, including any recourse to supra-
national courts. However, a state may use the construction of retroactivity after 
a final decision cannot challenged anymore.
5.  Decisions should only take effect when the (judicial) decision cannot be chal-
lenged anymore.”
2.6.3 Choices to be made
The abovementioned international standards do not leave much room for own 
fundamental choices. However, the choice of the type of courts which will deal 
with nationality issues (civil, criminal or administrative courts) is within the 
margin of appreciation of the States. Of course, the choice should fit the gen-
eral structure of the judiciary of the State. The same applies for procedural law 
issues. However, in respect of the burden of proof and the standard of proof, 
the guidelines of the UNHCR have to be taken into account by a court in cases 
where the answer to the question of whether or not a person possesses a foreign 
nationality is relevant for the acquisition or loss of nationality.162 In particular, a 
court should never conclude that a person is in possession of the nationality of a 
particular other State, if the authorities of this other State persist to deny this.163 
161 ILEC Guidelines 2015, III.
162 UNHCR Guidelines on statelessness No 4, para. 19-21; Tunis Conclusions 2013, para. 7 and 8; De Groot 2013c, 
para. 7.
163 Regrettably, the British Supreme Court seems to do so in the decision of 25 March 2015 dealing with the possible 
deprivation of British nationality of a Mr. Pham of Vietnamese origin. The deprivation could only take place if he was 
in possession of Vietnamese nationality, which was persistently denied by the Vietnamese authorities. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court concluded that he was a Vietnamese national. See UKSC 2013/0150, in particular para. 38.
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Doing otherwise was labelled by François Laurent as juridical heresy (hérésie 
juridique) already as far back as 1887.164
And of course a State has to regulate the fees due for procedures. These must be 
reasonable in light of the average wages in the country. Attention has also has 
to be paid to the financial consequences of an unsuccessful procedure. There 
should be no risk that the applicant in that case has to pay the costs made by the 
State. 
2.6.4 Relevant grounds for acquisition and loss and related general issues
As already mentioned above in para. 2.6.1, procedural safeguards are essen-
tial for all grounds of acquisition and loss. They need particular attention in 
quasi-loss situations, where authorities come to the conclusion that a person 
never acquired the nationality, although the person concerned was treated as a 
national in the past and will therefore experience this “non-acquisition” as loss 
of nationality.165
Procedural safeguards are intimately linked with other general issues, inter alia 
with the ban on arbitrary deprivation of nationality, equal treatment, non-dis-
crimination and the protection of legitimate expectations (see below para. 2.7).
2.6.5 An assessment of case 6
International standards allow the deprivation of the nationality acquired by nat-
uralisation or a similar procedure if fraud was committed during the procedure 
and the deprivation of nationality is a proportional reaction in light of the se-
verity of the fraud, the time that has passed since the fraud, the consequences 
of the deprivation of nationality for the person involved and the members of the 
family etcetera. In the case described above no attention is paid to the different 
relevant issues and circumstances. In particular, no attention is paid to the ques-
tion whether or not a criminal record was discovered after the authorities re-
ceived information about the real name and date of birth of the person involved. 
Furthermore, no relevance was awarded to the fact that she started to use the 
wrong name and date of birth as a minor. Although the Minister said to apply a 
proportionality test, this certainly did not happen in a way as prescribed by the 
Rottmann ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union.166
Critical remarks are also appropriate as regards the degree of “fraud”. The dif-
ference regarding the date of birth was only 10 months. In the case Hirsi Ali 167 
a difference of two years was at the end not sufficient to conclude that there was 
a relevant identity fraud. Furthermore, in the case described above the applicant 
used an obvious Western first name “Marlene”, whereas in Mongolia her birth 
164 Laurent 1887, no. 385, p. 493.
165 De Groot/ Wautelet 2014. See ILEC Guidelines 2015, V.
166 See for more details my very critical case note in Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 2014, no. 66, p. 338-342
167 See on that case De Groot 2007b.
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certificate indicated the name “Migeddorjiin”. However, it is quite common in 
the Far East to use in social contact with Westerners a “Western” first name, 
which is often also used on business cards. In respect of the family name we can 
also observe a particularity. Entering the Netherlands she used the family name 
“Erdene”, while the full family name is “Bat-Erdene”. The difference is only 
one syllable. Does this already constitute identity fraud? I have severe doubt 
about this.168 
Another major problem is the immediate effect of the deprivation of nation-
ality. A reasonable interpretation of international standards as following from 
inter alia the Rottmann ruling implies that the deprivation should only become 
effective once all judicial remedies have been exhausted. The legislator of the 
Netherlands should regulate that expressly. If a court is confronted with this 
issue, it could order that the State has to treat the person involved as a national 
during the proceedings. If a judge hesitates to do so, it is appropriate to initiate a 
preliminary ruling procedure in order to ask guidance from the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. 
168 Would I commit identity fraud, if I would present myself as “Groot” instead of “De Groot”?
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2.7 Protection of legitimate expectations
2.7.1 Case 7 Extension of naturalisation?
Twin girls Natasja and Olivia were born in 1995 in Paramaribo (Suriname). The 
parents were Surinamese spouses living in Aruba. After they discovered that the 
wife was pregnant with twins, the spouses decided that the delivery of the babies 
should take place in the hospital of Paramaribo due to its good reputation. Some 
days after the birth of the girls the whole family returned to Aruba. In 1998 the 
parents acquired Netherlands nationality by naturalisation. According to the text 
of Art. 11 of the Kingdom Statute on Netherlands nationality (as in force between 
1985 and 2003) the naturalisation of a parent included the naturalisation of minor 
children, except if a child was expressly excluded from this extension of natu-
ralisation. However, between 1992 and 2003 all Royal Decrees of naturalisation 
included the proviso that minor children whose residence in the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands was not covered by a residence permit allowing residence for indef-
inite time were excluded from this extension of naturalisation.169 Following the 
naturalisation of their parents, the twins were registered as Netherlands nationals 
in the population register. They received Netherlands passports, which were sever-
al times renewed. Having finished their secondary school education in 2014, the 
girls wanted to study in the Netherlands. They applied for new passports, but their 
applications were rejected by the Cabinet of the Kings Governor of Aruba due 
the fact that the Aruban Immigration Department (Departamento di Integracion, 
Maneho y Admision di Stranhero (DIMAS)) did not find copies in their files of their 
residence permits valid on the day of the naturalisation of their parents 16 years 
earlier. Consequently, it was concluded that Natasja and Olivia never acquired 
Netherlands nationality by extension of the naturalisation of their parents.170 
2.7.2 Relevant international standards
Above in para. 2.6.4 it was already mentioned that a close relationship exists 
between the ban on arbitrary deprivation of nationality and the protection of 
legitimate expectations. This is in particular true for the treatment of a person 
as a national. If after such treatment authorities come to the conclusion that the 
person concerned is not a national, this will be experienced as loss.171 If the le-
gitimate expectation to be treated as a national also in the future is not protected, 
this may amount to arbitrary deprivation of nationality.
In his opinion in the Rottmann case, Advocate General Poiares Maduro also 
mentioned the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations as one of 
the general principles of European law which may have consequences for the 
nationality law of Member States:
169 The relevant formulation was: ”Het Nederlanderschap is onthouden aan de minderjarige kinderen aan wie geen 
verblijf voor onbepaalde tijd in Nederland, onderscheidenlijk de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba, is toegestaan.”
170 This case was brought to my attention by a lawyer on behalf of the Minister of Justice of Aruba who was very 
embarrassed about the rejection by the Cabinet of the Governor of the twins’ application for new passports.
171 De Groot/ Wautelet 2014.
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“As regards the withdrawal of naturalisation at issue in this case, some might 
invoke against it the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations as to 
maintenance of the status of citizen of the Union.”172
However, in the Rottmann case there was no need to protect the expectations of 
Rottmann, because these were absolutely not legitimate due to the fraud com-
mitted by him. 
The need of protection of legitimate expectations is also the background of 
Principle 18 of Recommendation 2009/13 of the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe on the position of children in nationality law. As already 
mentioned above in para. 2.5.1 Member States are recommended to:
“provide that children who were treated in good faith as their nationals for a 
specific period of time should not be declared as not having acquired their na-
tionality;”
Para. 45 of the Explanatory Memorandum deals with the need of protecting 
legitimate expectations:
“45. It has to be stressed that Article 7, paragraph 1 (f) of the ECN also applies 
if it is established that, for instance, the family relationship which constituted 
the basis of the acquisition of the nationality of the child, was registered by mis-
take. The latter may be the case if for example the identity of the parent, which 
is relevant for the jure sanguinis acquisition of nationality, is discovered to be 
wrong, or in situations where it is discovered, after acquisition of the nationality 
by an ex lege extension of naturalisation, that no family relationship ever existed 
between the parent and the child.”
Consequently the discovery of these facts should never cause statelessness. Fur-
thermore, the child concerned should also after the discovery of these facts be 
in possession of the nationality if (s)he was treated as a national for a specific 
period of time determined by domestic law.
 
The ILEC Guidelines 2015 deal with the protection of legitimate expectations in 
the context of so-called quasi-loss of nationality:173
“In all cases of quasi-loss, and whatever characterization is retained by a state 
(i.e. constructing a situation of quasi-loss as a case of loss, deprivation or an-
nulment of acquisition), States should strive to protect the legitimate expecta-
tions of the persons concerned. The extent and strength of this protection may 
vary depending on the specific circumstances of the case. When a person has 
172 AG Poiares Maduro, Opinion in re Rottmann, para. 31.
173 ILEC Guidelines 2015, V.b. See also De Groot/ Wautelet 2014.
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enjoyed the benefit of a nationality for a period exceeding the maximum number 
of years required to acquire it by naturalisation, the State concerned should 
consider that such nationality was indeed duly acquired.
When a case of quasi-loss is discovered, States should preferably attempt to 
guarantee the continuation of the nationality of the person concerned. States are 
free to decide what mechanism or device they wish to use to guarantee such con-
tinuation. It may be that under the relevant national law, such continuation is 
achieved through the legal instrument of apparent status of national (possession 
d’état de nationalité), through an administrative recognition of nationality, or 
through another device. It is advisable to combine such legal instruments with 
limitation provisions.” 
The ILEC Guidelines also pay attention to the procedural dimension of the pro-
tection of the legitimate expectations:
“In order to determine the extent to which legitimate expectations deserve pro-
tection, a state should take into account all relevant circumstances of each indi-
vidual case and apply a proportionality test.
If a state intends to extend the consequences of a situation of quasi-loss to mem-
bers of the family of the person concerned, i.e. spouses or children, separate 
decisions on their nationality are necessary, which cannot be automatic replicas 
of the decision taken for the person concerned. These decisions should instead 
be taken after an individual assessment of the position of the spouse and/or 
children taking into account a proportionality test.
If the decision to consider that a person can be deprived of his nationality was 
based on the fraudulent conduct of this person, this conduct cannot automati-
cally be attributed to the spouse and/or children of the person. Such attribution 
can never take place in relation to children, if the adult only pretended to be the 
legal representative.”
In all cases concerning children involved in a quasi-loss situation, the decision 
should in the first place be guided by the best interests of the child.
2.7.3 Choices to be made
Of course a State has to decide after a how long period of treatment as a national 
in good faith legitimate expectations will be protected. As both the Explanatory 
Memorandum on Recommendation 2009/13 and the ILEC Guidelines point out 
(see above para. 2.7.1) the required length of that period may vary for different 
categories (e.g. shorter for children in light of the best interests of the child). 
49
A way to honour the legitimate expectations is to provide for a naturalisation, 
preferably free of charge.174 However, although this approach may work some-
times, it has considerable disadvantages. First, the naturalisation will – in princi-
ple175 - lack retroactivity. If the person concerned has descendants who were sup-
posed to have acquired their nationality iure filiationis because of the nationality 
of the person concerned, her or his naturalisation – without retroactivity – does 
not rescue the nationality of these descendants. They also have to be naturalised. 
Second, and this is the most important disadvantage, is a State willing to apply 
the process of naturalisation also in cases where the person involved deserves to 
have legitimate expectations protected but has a criminal record?
For those reasons a guarantee of the continuation of the possession of nation-
ality is preferable. As the ILEC Guidelines cited above in 2.7.1 indicate, States 
are free to decide what mechanism or device they wish to use to guarantee such 
continuation. Such decisions should fit the general structure of the legal system. 
In France and in legal systems influenced by the French tradition, this is certainly 
the consolidation of the nationality status due to having possessed during a spec-
ified period the apparent status of a national (possession d’état de nationalité).176 
In common law systems in the field of nationality one could follow the example 
of the United Kingdom by using the construction of an administrative recognition 
of nationality.177 But another option is the construction followed by Germany:178
“German citizenship shall also be acquired by any person who has been treated 
by German public authorities as a German national for 12 years and this has 
been due to circumstances beyond his or her control. In particular, any person 
who has been issued a certificate of nationality, a passport or a national iden-
tity card shall be treated as a German national. Acquisition of citizenship shall 
apply as of the date when the person was deemed to have acquired German 
citizenship by treating him or her as a German national. The acquisition of 
German citizenship shall extend to those descendants who derive their status as 
Germans from the beneficiary pursuant to sentence 1.”179
174 Compare the solution followed in the Netherlands for cases where the treatment as national is based on mistakes 
made by the competent authorities. See Handleiding voor de toepassing van de Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap, 
comment in para. 2.3 on Art. 10 RwNed.
175 However, giving naturalisation retroactivity is unusual but would in my opinion not violate international standards.
176 Art. 21-13 Cc français and Art. 18 Cc esp..
177 De Groot/ Wautelet 2014, para. 6.3.
178 Par. 3 StAG.
179 English translation available on http://eudo-citizenship.eu/admin/?p=file&appl=currentCitizenshipLaws&f=G
ER%20Nationality%20Act%20%28English%20consolidated%20version%201%20June%202012%29.pdf. 
The German original text reads: “Die Staatsangehörigkeit erwirbt auch, wer seit zwölf Jahren von deutschen Stellen 
als deutscher Staatsangehöriger behandelt worden ist und dies nicht zu vertreten hat. Als deutscher Staatsangehöri-
ger wird insbesondere behandelt, wem ein Staatsangehörigkeitsausweis, Reisepass oder Personalausweis ausgestellt 
wurde. Der Erwerb der Staatsangehörigkeit wirkt auf den Zeitpunkt zurück, zu dem bei Behandlung als Staatsange-
höriger der Erwerb der Staatsangehörigkeit angenommen wurde. Er erstreckt sich auf Abkömmlinge, die seither ihre 
Staatsangehörigkeit von dem nach Satz 1 Begünstigten ableiten.” 
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2.7.4 Relevant grounds for acquisition and loss and related general issues
Protection of legitimate expectations may be relevant for all grounds for auto-
matic acquisition or loss, but also for cases of naturalisation or acquisition of na-
tionality by registration or option, if the acquisition later proves to be defective.
The link between protection of legitimate expectations and the risk of arbitrary 
deprivation was already indicated above in para. 2.7.1. There is also an evident 
link with the equality principle.
2.7.5  Assessment of case 7
The non-existence of the protection of legitimate expectations in the nationality 
law of the Netherlands is extremely problematic in view of general principles of 
European Union law. As mentioned above, the protection of legitimate expec-
tations was mentioned as a general principle of EU law with relevancy for the 
nationality law of Member States. Not protecting such legitimate expectations 
amounts to quasi-loss of nationality and can be qualified as arbitrary loss. The 
legislator of the Kingdom of the Netherlands should undertake action to enshrine 
a rule on protection of legitimate expectations in the nationality legislation.
How should a judge react when confronted with a case such as that of the twins? 
First, a judge could decide to apply the principle of protection of legitimate ex-
pectation as a principle of European law. However, due to the fact that the high-
est courts in the Netherlands repeatedly stressed that Netherlands nationality law 
does not include this principle, it would be wise to initiate a preliminary ruling 
procedure and ask the Court of Justice of the European Union for guidance.180 
180 The case involved was “solved” in a surprising way. Nothing prevents a residence permit being granted with re-
troactivity. The government of Aruba decided to use that possibility and granted a residence permits with 18 years’ 
retroactivity (bekrachtiging verblijfstitel medegenaturaliseerden). This “saved” the extension of the parents’ naturali-
sation. See the decision of the Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie van Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten en van Bonaire, 
Sint Eustatius en Saba of 19 May 2015, HAR 63/14, Due to the fact that there are quite a number of similar cases in 
Aruba, the government enacted a Decree where the same solution was adopted in other cases. This approach was also 
followed by the government of Curaçao. 
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181 It is great that in 2015 the Americas could be added to the database (Vonk e.a.). Work in the MENA area (Van Waas 
e.a.), Africa (Manby e.a.) and the Far East and Oceania (Vonk e.a.) is in progress.
182 Compare the ILEC Guidelines, sub I: General guidelines on loss of nationality; De Groot 2013c, para. 6.
183 Compare the ILEC Guidelines, sub II: The principle of proportionality; De Groot/ Vink 2014, para.3.2.
184 Blitz/ Lynch 2011; Edwards/ Van Waas 2014; De Groot/ Swider/ Vonk 2015; Manly/ Van Waas 2014; Sawyer/ Blitz 
2011; Stiller 2011; Vonk/ De Groot 2013/ 2014; Van Waas 2008/ 2011/ 2012/ 2014
185 De Groot/ Vink 2008; Pitkänen/ Kalekin-Fishman 2007; Vonk 2012.
186 De Groot/ Wautelet 2014.
187 De Groot 2012b; see also the report of the UNHCR on Background Note on Gender Equality, Nationality Laws and 
Statelessness 2015, 6 March 2015, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/54f8369b4.html . 
3. Concluding observations
Please realise that in this lecture I could only offer a first impression of the tool-
box that I propose. The description of the standards, but in particular the choices 
to be made, the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the different op-
tions and the inventory of best practices have to be elaborated considerably and 
should be based on the rules and practices in all States of the world. Developing 
such a toolbox is a project on which an international and interdisciplinary team 
of experts should work. The toolbox project will prove to be useful for States 
dealing with nationality law issues, and in particular would facilitate discussions 
on the national level between stakeholders in debates on nationality law reforms.
But the project makes it also possible to identify issues which should be subject 
of (further) discussion and action on the international level in view of develop-
ing new, more detailed rules.
It is clear that all modes of acquisition and loss of nationality as listed in the 
Eudo-citizenship database deserve attention, either separately or in combination 
with each other. Relationships between the different modes have to be iden-
tified and analysed. In order to enable the drafters of the toolbox to refer to 
rules and practices stemming from all over the world, it is necessary to include 
all States in the Eudo-citizenship global database and to constantly update the 
global database.181 
A careful selection has to be made of general issues that deserves separate at-
tention. Besides the examples given in this lecture, candidates for being selected 
are: arbitrary deprivation of nationality182, the proportionality principle183, the 
avoidance of statelessness184, multiple nationality185, quasi-loss of nationality186, 
equality of men and women in nationality law.187
You will understand that I am willing to continue working on the toolbox that 
I am proposing, but I also stress that it is essential to share the workload with 
an international team of experts. Working on the toolbox will hopefully also 
enhance discussions – both academically and politically – on the improvement 
of nationality laws worldwide.
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4. Some words of thanks
At the end of this valedictory lecture it is appropriate to say words of thanks. I 
will not repeat the words of gratitude expressed in my inaugural lecture for the 
academic education I enjoyed in Groningen, Münster and Maastricht.188 I am 
sure that the inspiration of the examples of my academic professors and super-
visors is still visible in my work. However, I want to make two exceptions.
I thank wholeheartedly my dear Professor Hans-Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira. He 
was my professor for comparative law and legal philosophy at Groningen Uni-
versity, 45 years ago. But a bit later, both of us developed a strong interest in 
nationality and migration issues. During the past 40 years we frequently had 
debates with each other on these issues: sometimes in public,189 more often pri-
vately. Dear Ulli, you are a constant source of inspiration. I am grateful that you 
accompanied me during my whole academic career. Please continue to do that 
in the future. 
Furthermore, I want to thank Professor Bernard Grossfeld for his hospitality at 
the Institute of Comparative Law of the University of Münster (Germany). To 
work in that institute and have many talks with Grossfeld was extremely inspir-
ing for me. He furthermore introduced me to the German-Netherlands Lawyers 
Association190, of which I later became the Netherlands Chairman.191
Having worked at Maastricht University for 35 years I owe a lot to many of my 
Maastricht colleagues in past and present. It would not be difficult to sum up 
at least hundred names of persons important for me. I will not do so, but again 
make some exceptions.
It was a privilege to have been one of the members of staff building up a law de-
partment here in Maastricht. With great satisfaction I can now witness the many 
successes of this department. Of the colleagues with whom I collaborated in 
the first years of my work here in the 1980’s in Maastricht, I want to mention in 
particular Theo van Boven, Job Cohen, Karl Dittrich, Kees Flinterman, Marijke 
van Hoof, Victor Rutgers en Marlie Sprengers. I am in particular grateful that 
Kees acted 28 years ago as the supervisor of my thesis. 
Susan Rutten I want to thank for working with me for a period of some 30 years. 
We share a profound interest in developments in international family law, with 
a focus on challenges caused by the presence of an increasing number of people 
in our society with roots in the Islamic world. You are now professor of Islamic 
188 De Groot 1989.
189 Jessurun d’Oliveira 1978, 1989, 1990, 2011, 2013 and 2016.
190 Deutsch-Niederländische Juristenkonferenz. See http://www.deutsch-niederlaendische-juristenkonferenz.de/
191 I want to thank Carel Molenaar, Chantal Kuijpers and Yleen Simonis for their assistance with organising these 
conference biannually in the Netherlands. 
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family law in a European context and the chair of the Dutch Association for the 
Study of Islamic Law (RIMO192), which I co-founded in the early 1980s. I am 
happy that RIMO is flourishing in your hands with firm assistance of inter alia 
Pauline Kruiniger. You both were also – together with Stephan Rammeloo, Kees 
Saarloos and Michael Wells-Greco193- indispensable for teaching Private Inter-
national Law and Family Law in Europe.
Speaking about teaching, I have to mention Catalina Goanta without whom my 
course Introduction to Comparative Law would never have received such high 
student evaluations as it did in the past five years. 
My chair was part of the department of Private Law. Next to Susan Rutten, I 
want to thank the other chair holders in the department for their smooth co-
operation and friendship. I want to mention in particular Jan Smits, Sjef van 
Erp, Ton Hartlief, Mieke Olaerts, Kid Schwarz and last but not least professor 
emeritus Gerrit van Maanen, together with whom I started my academic career 
at Groningen University more than 42 years ago. I am also grateful for the ex-
cellent assistance of our secretariat and want to mention in particular Margriet 
van Woerden and José Crijnen. 
For my research activities in the past ten years Maarten Vink, Professor of Po-
litical Science and Political Sociology in de Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
was indispensable. I thank you for your willingness to embark together with 
me on so many interdisciplinary projects regarding nationality and citizenship. 
I think that our collaboration shows perfectly how fruitful an interdisciplinary 
approach can be. This is also illustrated by our collaborations as co-directors of 
MACIMIDE194, where I also enjoyed the inspiring ideas of Valentina Mazzucato 
and Melissa Siegel. I am also grateful for the cooperation with colleagues within 
CERiM195, in particular with Ellen Vos and Bruno De Witte. For their intensive 
collaboration in joint projects I also have to thank, among many others and in 
alphabetical order, Rainer Bauböck, Sergio Carrera Nuñez, Jo Shaw, Olivier 
Vonk,196 Laura van Waas and Patrick Wautelet. It was great working with you 
and I hope to be able to continue to do so for many years.
I want to stress that in particular I very much enjoyed to supervise PhD candi-
dates. I had the privilege of conferring the degree of doctor on – until now - 27 
persons. I always learned a great deal from their research, their questions and 
their answers. I am happy that several PhD candidates are still in the pipeline. I 
am looking forward to continue to work with them and accompany them until 
the moment they will earn their doctorate.
192 Vereniging voor de bestudering van het Recht van de Islam en het Midden-Oosten. See http://www.verenigingrimo.nl/. 
193 I also want to thank Michael Wells-Greco for correcting the English of this lecture.
194 Maastricht Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development. See https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl.
195 Centre for European Research in Maastricht. See https://cerim.maastrichtuniversity.nl. 
196 I am particularly grateful that Olivier Vonk was willing to send me his comments on the draft text of this lecture.
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Finally, I want to express my very special gratitude to three persons. 
First, I thank the Dean of the Faculty of Law, Professor Hildegard Schneider for 
all her support in the University, but more importantly privately. Without you, 
Dear Hildegard my life would be completely different.
I want to dedicate this lecture in gratitude to my children David and Sophia. 
The lecture had its focus on the future, not on the past, but was firmly based on 
past experiences. The University is a community of older and younger people 
working together in order to achieve – based on knowledge gathered in the past 
and new research - a better future for all, in particular for coming generations. 
And, of course, both of you are for me the most important representatives of the 
younger generation.
Ruit hora: 47 years ago - in August 1969- I started to study law at Groningen 
University. In the first week of the academic year all students received the Tab-
ula Academica Universitatis Groninganae, a poster with the names of all uni-
versity professors with indication of their chair. The given names were Latinised 
and the description of their chair was in Latin. For each department the list of 
professors started by the professores emeriti. After their names, the following 
words were added: propter aetatum immunis, quantum poterit, commilitonum 
studia adiuvabit.197 He helps when is able to do so.
After the rite de passage of which this lecture was the main part, I will also be 
professor emeritus and I therefore pledge solemnly: adiuvaro quantum potuero.
Dixi
197 I am grateful that Rolf ter Sluis, conservator Universiteitsmuseum RUG, sent me a photograph of the Tabula 
Academiae of the year 1969.
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List of abbreviations of international treaties, protocols and 
recommendations
ACC  1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
AmCHR  1969 American Convention on Human Rights
ArCHR  2004 Arab Charter on Human Rights 
ASEAN 2012 ASEAN Declaration of Human Rights
CEDAW   1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women
CERD   1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination
CISC  1995 Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
CNMW 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women
CRCI  2005 Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam
CRC  1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CRD  2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CRS  1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
DASS  1999 Draft Articles by the International Law Commission on 
Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of 
States
ECAC  1967 European Convention on the Adoption of Children (revised 
in 2008)
ECN  1997 European Convention on Nationality 
ECSS   2006 Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of 
Statelessness in Relation to State Succession
HAC  Hague Adoption Convention (= 1993 Hague Convention on 
protection of children and co-operation in respect of intercountry 
adoption)
HCNL  1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the 
Conflict of Nationality Laws
ICCPR  1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ILEC Involuntary Loss of European Citizenship
OPAN  1963 Optional Protocol Concerning Acquisition of Nationality 
(belonging to the Convention on Consular Relations)
Rec 2009/13  Recommendation CM/Rec (2009)13 of the Committee of 
Ministers to member states of the Council of Europe on the 
nationality of children
UDHR 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
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Other Abbreviations
ACIT Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration
BC Before Christ
BNA British Nationality Act
Cc esp. Código civil español (Civil code of Spain)
Cc fran. Code civil français (Civil code of France)
CETS Council of Europe Treaty Series
CoE Council of Europe
c.s. cum suis (and associates)
e.g. exempli gratia (for example)
EUDO European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
ETS European Treaty Series
HRC Human Rights Council
i.a. inter alia (amongst others)
ICJ International Court of Justice
i.e. id est (this is)
ILC International Law Commission
LNTS League of Nations Treaty Series
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organisation of African Unity
pp. pages
para. paragraph
RwNed  Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap (Nationality Act of the 
Netherlands)
SG UN  Secretary General of the United Nations
StAG Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Nationality Act of Germany)
StBG Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz (Nationality Act of Austria)
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series
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Glossary of Latin terms 
De facto  factually; in fact 
De iure  legally 
Ex lege  by operation of the law, automatically 
Ex nunc  without retroactivity 
Ex officio  by virtue of office or position 
Ex tunc  with retroactivity 
Guardian ad litem  representative appointed by a court in order to 
represent a minor in certain legal proceedings
Iure filiationis by ius filiationis
Iure sanguinis  by ius sanguinis 
Iure soli  by ius soli 
Ius filiationis  Lit.: right of the parentage: a person acquires 
the nationality of a parent at birth or by 
the establishment of a child-parent family 
relationship. See also ius sanguinis
Ius sanguinis   Lit.: right of the blood: a person acquires 
the nationality of a parent at birth or by 
the establishment of a child-parent family 
relationship. N.B.: the expression ius filiationis 
is more accurate! 
Ius filiationis a matre  Lit.: right of the parentage from the mother: a 
person acquires the nationality of the mother at 
birth or by the establishment of a child-mother 
family relationship. See also ius sanguinis a 
matre
Ius filiationis a patre  Lit.: right of the parentage from the father: a 
person acquires the nationality of the father at 
birth or by the establishment of a child-father 
family relationship. See also ius sanguinis a patre
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Ius sanguinis a matre   Lit.: right of the blood from the mother: a person 
acquires the nationality of the mother at birth or 
by the establishment of a child-mother family 
relationship. N.B.: the expression ius filiationis a 
matre is more accurate!
Ius sanguinis a patre   Lit.: right of the blood from the father: a person 
acquires the nationality of the father at birth or 
by the establishment of a child-father family 
relationship. N.B.: the expression ius filiationis a 
patre is more accurate!
Ius soli   Lit.: right of the soil: a person acquires the 
nationality of his country of birth 
Nulla perditio sine  Lit.: no loss [of nationality] without a previous
praevia lege  law [which provides for the loss]
Pater est quem  The husband of the mother is the legal father of
matrimonium  the child
demonstrat   
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